Michigan Law Review
Volume 101

Issue 6

2003

Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The Guilt
by Association Critique
Robert M. Chesney
Wake Forest University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Legal Writing and Research
Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The Guilt by Association
Critique, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1408 (2003).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol101/iss6/3

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE TERRORISM
PREVENTION PARADIGM: THE GUILT BY
ASSOCIATION CRITIQUE
Robert M. Chesney*
TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY. By

David Cole and James X
Dempsey. New York: The New Press. 2d ed. 2002. Pp. xvii, 231 . Paper,
$16.95.

ENEMY

ALIENS:

DOUBLE

STANDARDS

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL

FREEDOMS IN THE wAR ON TERRORISM. By

David Cole. New York:
The New Press. 2003. Pp. xiii, 315. Cloth, $24.95.
[T/he Department must shift its primary focus from investigating and
prosecuting past crimes to identifying threats of future terrorist acts,
preventing them from happening, and punishing would-be perpetrators for
their plans of terror.
- Attorney General John Ashcroft, Nov. 8, 20011

[W]e all know that the way we treat you is the measure of our own
liberties.
- United States District Judge William Young to "shoe bomber"
Richard Reid, Jan. 31, 20032

I.

INTRODUCTION

Faysal Galab is a twenty-seven-year-old American citizen of
Yemeni descent who was born and raised in Buffalo, New York.3 He is
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. B.S. 1994, Texas
Christian; J.D. 1997, Harvard - Ed. I would like to thank Mike Green, David Logan, Mi
chael Perry, Margaret Taylor, and Ron Wright for their invaluable comments and sugges
tions. I welcome comments and criticisms at rchesney@law.wfu.edu.

I. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Heads of the Components
of the Department of Justice (Nov. 8, 20Cll) [hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum], available
at http:www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/1 l/ag-me mo-11 0801.html.

2. Tavia Smith, Shoe Bomber Richard Reid to Serve Life Sentence for Trying to Blow up
an Airplane, NPR MORNING EDITION, Jan. 31, 2003, 2003 WL 4856067.
3. Except as otherwise indicated, the following account derives from United States v.
Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (relating substance of Galab's plea agreement);
United Stales v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Goba !]; Plea
Agreement, United States v. Mosed, No. 02-CR-214-S (W.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Mosed
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married, has three children, and used to run a gas station in the
Buffalo suburb of Lackawanna. Perhaps you have heard of him; he
will be spending some or all of the next ten years in federal prison
because in the spring of 2001 he and six other Lackawanna residents
traveled to Afghanistan and trained with Al Qaeda.4
Their journey began on April 28, 2001 , when Galab and two com
panions flew from New York to Lahore, Pakistan, purportedly in
order to pursue religious studies. But Galab and his companions did
not remain in Pakistan, let alone immerse themselves in peaceful
religious studies. Instead, they traveled to Quetta, a town near the
Afghan border, and from there crossed into Afghanistan. Eventually
the men arrived at a camp funded by Osama bin Ladin known as
al Farooq,5 where they commenced training in a variety of weapons
and military skills. Among other things, Galab trained with explosives
and learned to assemble and operate Kalashnikov assault rifles, 9mm
handguns, M16 assault rifles, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers.
His curriculum also included a lecture component: at some point in
May, bin Ladin himself addressed the trainees regarding the virtues of
armed struggl� against the United States and Israel. At another point,
we are told, bin Ladin asked one of the Lackawanna men whether any
Americans might be willing to die in Al Qaeda's service.
In the summer of 2001, the men returned to the United States and
resumed their quiet lives in Lackawanna. The FBI, alerted to their
activities in Afghanistan, watched and wondered. Were they an Al
Qaeda sleeper cell, awaiting orders to carry out unspeakable acts? Or
were they merely foolish adventurers whose religious convictions had
led them unwittingly and temporarily into Al Qaeda's company?
Months passed by, and in the absence of evidence indicating an intent
to engage in any specific criminal act, the FBI was left with no option
but to watch, wait, a�d worry.6 Or so it seemed.
Plea Agreement]; Plea Agreement, United States v. Gaba, No. 02-CR-214-S (W.D.N.Y.
2002) (hereinafter Goha Plea Agreement]; Matthew Purdy & Lowell Bergman, Unclear
Danger: Inside the Lackawanna Terror Case,.N.Y. TIM ES, Oct. 12, 2003, at Al; and Tatsha
Robertson, Trip By Buffalo Suspects Billed as Pilgrimage, B OSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21 , 2002, at
A3.
4. According to an affidavit from an FBI agent associated with the investigation, an
unnamed eighth Lackawanna resident separately attended the Afghanistan training camp.
See Affidavit of Special Agent Edward J. Needham at 'll'll 8, 24, United States v. Elbaneh,
No. 02-M-111 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002).
5. According to Bruce Hoffman of the Rand Corporation and Rohan Gunaratna of the
University of Scotland, al Farooq was a mixed-use training facility at the time. Hoffman es
timates that over the years "al Farooq trained some 70,000 persons in basic military skills in
connection with the Afghan civil war, and some 7,000 more in 'advanced terrorist training'
for other purposes." See Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad, NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50,
53.
6. "Almost from the day the [USA PATRIOT Act] was signed in October, these defen
dants' phone conversations, financial and travel records, and e-mails had been relentlessly
and secretly examined by FBI agents, after they had obtained a warrant from the special na-
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The approach of the first anniversary of September 1 1th prompted
administration officials to become increasingly concerned about the
risk of additional terrorist attacks in the United States, and the
administration's attention naturally focused on those individuals like the men from Lackawanna - who the government knew had
trained in bin Ladin's camps.7 And although the FBI had the men
under surveillance, officials were keenly aware that there might be no
affirmative sign of their intentions until it was too late to intervene.
The September 1 1th hijackers, after all, had not manifested their
illegal intentions until they stood up in the aisle of the doomed planes.
Accordingly, top administration officials - possibly including the
President himself - directed the FBI to take preventive action.8
Galab and his companions were promptly arrested,9 but not on
charges of conspiracy to commit a terrorist act; instead they were
charged with providing "material support" to a designated foreign ter
rorist organization ("DFTO") in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.1 0
Section 2339B, once little known and rarely employed, has rapidly
emerged as a central element of the government's post-9/11 terrorism
prevention paradigm.11 Its popularity flows primarily from the fact that
it chokes off the flow of cash, weapons, and other resources to
DFTOs, thus hampering their ability to engage in violence. In this

tional security court." Steven Brill, After: How America Confronted the Sept. 12 Era,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. JO, 2003, at 66, 71; see also Scot J. Paltrow, U.S. Exerts Unusual Pressure
On Group of Terror Suspects, WALL ST. J., Apr. l, 2003 at AS (citing a former senior FBI
official involved in the investigation for the proposition that "secret surveillance revealed no
sign that the men had any hostile intent").
7. Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet believed at the time that Galab and his
fellows were " 'the most dangerous bunch inside the United States.' " Toni Locy & Kevin
Johnson, How U.S. Watches Terrorist Suspects; Lackwanna Case Helped Shape FBl's Strat
egy of Operation After 9111: Shortened Investigations, Quick Arrests, USA TODAY, Feb. 12,
2003, at Al. At least some FBI analysts disputed the CIA's assessment. See Purdy & Berg
man, supra note 3.

8. Brill, supra note 6, at 71 (describing Ashcroft's "frustration" that the only crime with
which the Lackawanna men could be charged was § 2339B); Locy & Johnson, supra note 7.
9. One of the Lackawanna trainees - Jaber Elbaneh - remains at large. See Purdy &
Bergman, supra note 3.
JO. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l) (2000). The material support statute incorporates by refer
ence § 21 9(a)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which empowers the Secretary of
State to designate any group as a foreign terrorist organization upon finding three criteria
satisfied: (1) the organization is foreign; (2) the organization engages in terrorism as defined
in various statutes; and (3) such terrorism "threatens the security of United States nationals
or the national security of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 89(a)(l) (incorporated by refer
ence in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6) (2000)).

11. See Eric Lichtblau, A Seldom-Used Statute Becomes the Justice Department's Anti/er
ror Weapon of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at B15. Attorney General Ashcroft has
explained that "the central thrust of our campaign against terror must be proactive preven
tion and disruption, and not primarily reactive investigation and prosecution. We cannot
wait for terrorists to strike to begin investigations and make arrests. We must prevent first
and prosecute second." Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note l.
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respect, § 2339B functions much like an embargo on foreign terrorist
groups. But the material support law turns out to have an additional
capacity for prevention, one that raises thorny constitutional issues. A
careful review of the manner in which the government interprets the
phrase "material support" suggests that the statute could in some
circumstances be used to punish membership in a DFTO, regardless of
whether the member intends to facilitate, or even knows of, any illegal
purpose of the group. Can this be squared with First Amendment
protections for freedom of expression and association? Keeping in
mind the Lackawanna example and the lessons of September 1 1th, can
we afford a less aggressive approach?
Similar questions have arisen with respect to many aspects of the
terrorism prevention paradigm, igniting a passionate debate among
scholars and commentators arguing from both the civil liberties and
national security perspectives. Into this debate come not one, but two
timely and important books by Professor David Cole of Georgetown
University Law Center.12 The earlier of the two is Terrorism and
the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National
Security ("Terrorism"),13 which Cole coauthored with James X.
Dempsey of the Center for Democracy and Technology.14 Terrorism
and the Constitution takes aim at the war on terrorism in its
early stages, reflecting developments through the end of 2001. Writing
alone in the second book, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and
Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism ("Enemy Aliens"),
Cole brings these criticisms up to date through the summer of 2003.
In a: narrow sense, these books focus on distinct issues. In
Terrorism and the Constitution, Cole and Dempsey argue that the gov
ernment was overreacting to the threat of terrorism at the expense of
civil liberties even prior to 911 1, and that the subsequent war on ter
rorism has exacerbated this problem. To illustrate the point, the
authors focus primarily on the authority of the FBI to engage in
12. Cole is a prolific author and advocate with respect to civil liberties and immigration
law issues, and in recent months he has emerged as one of the most prominent critics of the
legal front in the war on terrorism. See, e.g. , David Cole, Their Liberties, Our Security: De
mocracy and Double Standards, BOSTON REV., Oct./Nov. 2002, at 4.
13. The 2002 edition of Terrorism supersedes a first edition which appeared in 1999.
JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (lst ed. 1999). The events of Sep
tember 1 1th, and resulting government actions undertaken in the name of enhanced security,
naturally warranted a reexamination of the arguments set forth in the original edition, and
although the second edition retains substantially all of the material from the first, it also pro
vides a new chapter and expanded conclusion focusing on the USA PATRIOT Act and re
lated post-9/11 antiterrorism measures.
14. "Since the early 1990s, [Jim Dempsey] has been one of the leading watchdogs of FBI
surveillance initiatives, a reasoned and respected civil liberties advocate routinely sum
moned to the Hill by both political parties to advise lawmakers about technology and pri
vacy issues." Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Six Weeks in Autumn, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2002
(Magazine), at 6, 6.
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national security investigations and the resulting capacity for political
suppression. Enemy Aliens has a broader scope, focusing on the
impact of the war on terrorism - and prior periods of national secu
rity concern - on noncitizens. Cole argues that in times of crisis our
society tends to sacrifice the rights of noncitizens in the politically
convenient but ultimately futile hope of increasing security for all, and
that such deprivations in turn become precedents for extending like
treatment to citizens at a later date.15
Notwithstanding these differences, the books are united by a
common understanding of our society's treatment of civil liberties in
past times of national security crisis. Each describes a historical cycle
of civil liberties abuse during such periods, but with an important twist
on the traditional narrative: repressive measures do not merely resur
face from time to time, but rather they evolve to circumvent norms,
precedents, and institutional-civil-liberties protections erected after
past abuses were recognized and regretted. I term this evolutionary
perspective the adaptive-learning model. It provides the lens through
which the authors in both books survey and critique many of the
antiterrorism laws and policies adopted in recent years.
In Part II below, I locate the adaptive-learning model among
various perspectives offered by scholars who have examined the
performance of government with respect to civil liberties under crisis
or emergency conditions. Against that backdrop, Parts III and IV set
forth in broad strokes the specific critiques of antiterrorism law
provided in Terrorism and the Constitution and Enemy Aliens, respec
tively. Part V then concludes with a close analysis of an argument
which plays a significant role in both books and which is representa
tive of the adaptive-learning theme: the claim that the law prohibiting
material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations resur
rects the unconstitutional principle of guilt by association ( Terrorism,
pp. 121-23; Enemy Aliens, pp. 58-64). I conclude that this claim is
significantly overstated in most - but not all - circumstances, and
that it therefore provides only limited support for the adaptive
learning model.
Ultimately, however, one does not have to accept the adaptive
learning model to appreciate the tremendous contribution Cole and
Dempsey make in these books. They draw needed attention to the
unique vulnerabilities of noncitizens; they raise difficult questions
about a range of antiterrorism measures; and the stories they relate
put a human face on the abstract concept of civil liberties. Our
national debate can only be improved as a result.
15. Many of these ideas first appeared, in abbreviated form, in David Cole, Enemy
Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002) [hereinafter Cole, Enemy Aliens], and David Cole, The
New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terror, 38 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REV. 1
(2003) [hereinafter Cole, The New McCarthyism].
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THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CALIBRATION ERRORS

Conventional wisdom holds that during times of crisis the balance
between liberty and security shifts in favor of the latter. 16 Although
not without its difficulties,17 this claim is broadly consistent with
historical experience, 18 and has some support in recent empirical
work.19 But the naked fact of a change in the balance between liberty
and security, without more, tells us nothing about whether society is
better or worse off as a result. One cannot assume, after all, that "the
legal baseline prior to the emergency . . . already embodies the optimal
balance between liberty and security."20 It may be the case that the
status quo ante delivered too little security, or that in light of changed
circumstances the prior balance is no longer appropriate.21 Accord
ingly, whether a calibration error has occurred in any particular case
- i.e., whether the balance between liberty and security has been
struck poorly - requires closer analysis.
16. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Respon ses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional? 1 1 2 YALE L. J. 101 1 , 1019 (2003) ("Experience shows that when grave na
tional crises are upon us, democratic nations tend to race to the bottom as far as the protec
tion of human rights and civil liberties, indeed of basic and fundamental legal principles, is
concerned."); Rodney A. Smolla, Terrorism and the Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 551, 573-74 (2002); see also Floyd Abrams, The First Amendment and the War Against
Terrorism, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 , 10-11 (2002); Thomas E. Baker, A t War with Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 219 (2002); Paul Finkelman, Civil Liberties
and Civil War: The Great Emancipator as Civil Libertarian, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1353, 1362
(1993) (reviewing MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991)) (stating that "if truth is the first casualty of wartime, then civil lib
erties is surely the second" (internal citation omitted)); Wendy Kaminer, False Security,
BOSTON REV., Oct./Nov. 2002, at 20.
17. The notion of a zero-sum balance between liberty and security with respect to a
given policy choice falsely assumes a "one-dimensional policy space." Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003)
(manuscript at 6, on file with author). In reality, policy changes may have varying impacts
along multiple dimensions, decreasing liberty in some respects and increasing it in others.
See id. (providing an example with respect to airport security screening). The "interdepend
ence of budgeting choices that affect rights," moreover, further confounds claims about the
impact of a given policy on individual rights. Id. (manuscript at 6-7) (pointing out that in
creased financing for one rights-enhancing policy may entail a decrease for another).
18. See, e.g., ZECHARIA CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (reprint
ed., Lawbook Exchange 2001) (1941) (discussing conflicts between liberty and security in
American history); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING
PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000)
(same); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
(1998) (describing security measures taken at the expense of civil liberties in the context of
various crises).
19. See Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Silence During War 2 (unpublished manuscript)
(finding that "when the country is at war, the probability that the U.S. Supreme Court will
vote to uphold a civil rights or civil liberties claim drops by about 15 percent"), available at
http://gking.harvard.edu/files/crisis.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
20. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17 (manuscript at 12).
21. See id. (manuscript at 1 2-13) (noting argument that intelligence agencies were
unduly restrained prior to 9/1 1 ).
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In recent years, a number of scholars have addressed the issue of
government policymaking under crisis or emergency conditions in an
effort to facilitate that analysis. In this Part, I situate Cole and
Dempsey's approach amidst these varying perspectives.
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have recently observed that
accounts of decisionmaking in a crisis context often accord a central
role to one of two dynamics: the impact of fear, and the impact of past
instances in which liberty gave way to security interests.22 Both tradi
tions exert an influence on Terrorism and the Constitution and Enemy
Aliens, but Cole and Dempsey blend and extrapolate from them in a
manner which produces their own unique - and markedly pessimistic
- perspective.
Consider fear. The proposition behind the fear dynamic is that fear
will tend to distort policymaking under crisis conditions by interfering
with j udgment and thus increasing the risk of a calibration error with
respect to liberty-security tradeoffs.23 In this account, fear may cause
decisionmakers either to overestimate the scope of the security
threat,24 to underestimate the value of the civil liberties at stake,25 or
both.
On the security side of the ledger, the most extreme form of the
fear argument involves the sociological concept of moral panic.26 A
moral panic is said to exist when a "condition, episode, person, or
group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal
values and interests," and "its nature is presented in a stylized and
stereotypical fashion by the mass media and politicians. "27 As Eliza22. See id. (manuscript at 3-4) (identifying these two traditions as the primary arguments
supporting the view that the constitution should be strictly rather than flexibly interpreted
during emergencies).
23. See id. (manuscript at 17-30).
24. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 16, at 1038-42 (discussing cognitive limitations and biases
relating to fear in the context of national emergency); W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhau
ser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce Terrorism Risks, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 99,
100 (2003) (assessing emerging empirical evidence that "(t]he extraordinary publicity given
to the [9/11] attack and the accompanying losses produced the kind of risk that people are
likely to severely misestimate in the future").
25. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985) (discussing tendency to underestimate value of civil liberties in
emergency context).
26. There have been few claims that 9/11 produced moral panic conditions. See Nicole
Rogers & Aidan Ricketts, Fear of Freedom: Anti-Terrorism Laws and the Challenge to Aus
tralian Democracy, 2002 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 149, 163 (2002) (arguing that a moral panic
has ensued in Australia as a result of the 9/11 attacks, providing "an opportunity for the
Government to justify a far reaching attack upon the civil and political liberties of the Aus
tralian public"); cf. Daniel M. Filler, Terrorism, Panic, and Pedophilia, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y
& L. 345, 367-69 (arguing that the initial reaction to 9/11 contained elements of a moral
panic directed at Muslims).
27. STANLEY COHEN, FOLK D EVILS AND MORAL PANICS 9 (1972); see also ERICH
GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
DEVIANCE (1994).
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beth Scott and Laurence Steinberg recently explained in another
context, a moral panic includes the following elements: "an intense
community concern (often triggered by a publicized incident) that is
focused on deviant behavior, an exaggerated perception of the
seriousness of the threat and the number of offenders, and collective
hostility toward the offenders, who are perceived as outsiders threat
ening the community. "28 Because one of the defining elements of a
moral panic is overestimation of danger, the label carries with it the
conclusion that legal or policy changes driven by moral panic are
inherently ill-considered.
Fear need not rise to the level of moral panic, however, to contrib
ute to a calibration error based on fau lty assessments of danger.29 The
literature of cognitive bias is relevant here. As Oren Gross has argued,
a number of cognitive biases or limitations interfere with risk assess
ments in the crisis context, particularly where ter rorism is involved.30
The "availability heuristic," for example, suggests that one's estimate
of the probability of an event may be inflated by one's "ability to
imagine similar events taking place," a process that since 9/11 can be
expected to boost estimates of the likelihood of additional terrorist
attacks in America.31 Similarly, " [p]rospect theory suggests that indi
viduals tend to give excessive weight to low-probability results when
the stakes are high enough and the outcomes are particularly bad," a
dynamic which may function with particular force when the feared
harm "involves not merely a serious loss, but one that produces
particularly strong emotions."32 Recent empirical work provides some

28. Elizabeth Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 799, 807
(2003); see also MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION LAWS AND THE EXPANDING
I.N.S. JAIL COMPLEX 9-34 (using a moral panic model to discuss concern over immigration
in the 1990's).
29. The fear model assumes that the impact of fear on decisionmaking is, on the whole,
negative. That assumption, however, overlooks the complexities of the relationship between
fear and cognition. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 17 (manuscript ·at 19-30) (providing a
nuanced account of this relationship in the course of rejecting the view that fear necessarily
produces ill-considered policy).
30. See Gross, supra note 16, at 1038-42.
31. Id. at 1039 (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 1 1
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); and Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, A vailability:
A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973)); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121,
1 21 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect] (discussing the impact
of the availability heuristic on terrorism-risk assessment).
32. Gross, supra note 16, at 1 040-41 (citing Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Pros
pect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 1 7
(20Cll ); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 1 1 2 YALE
L.J. 61, 66 (2002); and Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 1 15 HARV. L. REV. 1 119, 113744 (2002) (book review)); see also Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, supra note
31, at 1 21-22 (discussing impact of affect-rich probabilities).
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support for these arguments,33 although there also is reason to be
cautious in extrapolating from these points.34
On the liberties side of the ledger, Vincent Blasi has argued that
crisis conditions can prompt policymakers to systematically under
value civil liberties - particularly those allowing for political dissent.35
Blasi describes a "pathology" that takes hold under crisis conditions, a
"social phenomenon, characterized by a notable shift in attitudes
regarding the tolerance of unorthodox ideas. What makes a period
pathological is the existence of certain dynamics that radically increase
the likelihood that people who hold unorthodox views will be
punished for what they say or believe."36 In many if not most
instances, a period of pathology is triggered and defined by the
perception of a serious security threat, as in the case of communism
during the Red Scare and in the McCarthy era. When crafting First
Amendment doctrine, Blasi wrote, we should anticipate the rigors our
First Amendment values might face during the next pathological
cycle.37 Some commentators have suggested that we are, or at least
were, in the midst of a pathological moment in the wake of 9/11 .38
The concept of fear as a distorting influence on both sides of the
ledger is significant throughout both Terrorism and the Constitution
and Enemy Aliens, but Cole and Dempsey make use of the concept in
distinctive fashion. In their account, the important factor is not how

33. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 24, at 108-16 (discussing biases impacting risk
beliefs relating to terrorism); cf Baruch Fischhoff et al., J11dged Terror Risk and Proximity to
the World Trade Center, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 1 37, 1 47-48 (2003) (discussing the
impact of proximity to the World Trade Center (and of emotional state) on risk estimates
relating to the probability of injury in a future terrorist attack).
34. Given the likelihood that many Americans underestimated the probability of a ter
rorist attack occurring in America prior to 9/1 1 , it is an open question whether the upward
impact of 9/11 on estimates of future attacks has functioned as a distortion or, instead, as a
corrective. Cf Posner & Vermeule, s11pra note 17 (manuscript at 2 1-29) (discussing offset
ting benefits of fear, including its ability to spur action from complacency).
35. See Blasi, supra note 25.
36. Id. at 450. The proposition that episodes of pathology arise periodically in response
to perceived emergency conditions raises an important question: Can the government artifi
cially prolong a perceived state of emergency in order to sustain the increased freedom of
action it enjoys as a result? See Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U.
PITT. L. REV. 767, 772-82 (2002) (asserting that the government has sustained a perpetual
state of emergency with respect to a succession of threats including, most recently, terror
ism). But see Posner & Vermeule, s11pra note 17 (manuscript at 6-12) (denying the existence
of a "statist ratchet" pattern in which successive emergencies produce continuous expansion
of government power at the expense of civil liberties).
37. See Blasi, s11pra note 25, at 459. Professor Blasi purposefully wrote with respect to
the First Amendment alone, see id. at 457, but an argument can be made that his points ap
ply to an extent to other constitutional values such as due process of law and privacy.
38. See Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Co11nter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 4, on file with author); Kathleen K. Olson, Courtroom
Access After 9111: A Pathological Perspective, 7 COMM. L. & POLICY 461 , 462 ("Civil liber
tarians agree that the nation finds itself in the midst of pathological times.").
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fear impacts well-intentioned decisionmakers but, instead, how it im
pacts the public to which government officials might have to answer.39
Put another way, the main issue in their view is not whether fear will
cause well-intentioned officials to make mistakes but instead whether
fear will cause the public to tolerate overreaching by the government.
And as Cole relates in Enemy Aliens, public fear during times of crisis
in our history often focuses on outsiders, particularly noncitizens.40 As
a result, Cole contends, government overreaching that impinges
largely or primarily on the interests of noncitizens - the "other" ordinarily is tolerated by citizens (Enemy Aliens, pp. 18, 72, 8 1-82).
The other major tradition influencing Cole and Dempsey's work is
the proposition that past events in the cycle of tension between liberty
and security have a lasting impact on the outcome of future events in
that cycle. Mark Tushnet, for example, has described a process of "so
cial learning" in which the recognition of past calibration errors tends
to reduce the likelihood of comparable errors in the future.41 "Know
ing that government officials in the past have in fact exaggerated
threats to national security or have taken actions that were ineffective
with respect to the threats that actually were present," Tushnet argues,
"we have become increasingly skeptical about contemporary claims
regarding those threats, with the effect that the scope of proposed
government responses to threats has decreased. "42
This learned skepticism manifests itself in a variety of liberty
protecting forms. Most obviously, there are j udicial precedents and
institutional safeguards within government itself that function as
bulwarks protecting individual rights. Equally if not more important,
the social-learning process generates watchdogging behavior by the
media and public interest groups. Finally, socialization sensitizes the

39. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 7, 48; TERRORISM, p. 1 13; cf Sunstein, Terrorism and Probabil
ity Neglect, supra note 31, at 1 29-31 (discussing political ramifications of public fear based on
overestimates of risk).
40. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 85-87. In this respect Cole's approach is akin to a relaxed ver
sion of the moral panic concept, which similarly emphasizes outsider status. See supra notes
26-28 and accompanying text.
41. See Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu? Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime,
2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 283.
42. Id. at 283-84; see also Eric Muller, Inference or Impact? Racial Profiling and the In
ternment's True Legacy, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 29, 33, on
file with author) (discussing "firebreaks" in the "legal landscape" which might operational
ize social learning from past mistakes in balancing liberty and security); Eric Muller, 1217
and 9111: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 571, 587, 591,
(2002) (arguing, with respect to measures pertaining to race and ethnicity only, that the Ad
ministration's post-9/11 policies reflect "a premise of moderation" that can be attributed in
part to a "change in the legitimacy of racial and ethnic assumptions in our policymaking"
since the time of the Second World War); Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tri
bunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENTARY
261, 262 (2002) (similar). But see Posner and Vermeule, supra note 17 (manuscript at 14)
(criticizing the "libertarian ratchet" concept).
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public - and especially lawyers - to the potential for calibration
errors. The net impact is to increase and entrench restraints on the
government's freedom of action. The social-learning model accord
ingly predicts that the recognition of calibration errors from, say, the
Cold War era will prevent repetition of those errors on the same scale
during, say, the current wave of concern over terrorism.
Cole and Dempsey accept that our society has a history of commit
ting calibration errors that are recognized as such and regretted after
the fact ( Terrorism, pp. 71-89; Enemy Aliens, pp. 88-158). But they do
not appear to accept the social-learning model. On the contrary, the
primary historical trend emphasized in Enemy Aliens is the govern
ment's purported tendency to eventually extend to citizens those
rights-depriving measures that are established initially with respect to
noncitizens (Enemy Aliens, pp. 85-87). To the extent that government
action is recognized as a mistake, in this view, we can expect to see the
government evolve in order to circumvent any entrenched civil liberty
protections that are created as a result. As Cole has stated the point
elsewhere, the "war on terrorism has already demonstrated our gov
ernment's remarkable ability to evolve its tactics in ways that allow it
simultaneously to repeat history and to insist that it is not repeating
history . . . . A historical comparison reveals not so much a repudiation
as an evolution of political repression. "43 In this model, which I refer to
as the adaptive-learning model, the social-learning ratchet is ineffec
tive at best and at worst lulls us into a false sense that our civil liberties
are not at stake. The adaptive-learning model in this sense lies at the
heart of both Terrorism and the Constitution and Enemy Aliens.
III. TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: WATCHING THE
WATCHERS

In Terrorism and the Constitution, Cole and Dempsey's primary
concern is the scope of the FBI's national security investigative
authority. In the past, they explain, this authority was the root of grave
civil liberties violations as the FBI used muscular and intrusive inves
tigations expressly to disrupt First Amendment activity by politically
disfavored groups and individuals. After an interim period of reform,
the authors warn, the threat of similar abuse has reemerged recently in
a more subtle form due to changes in the law generated by fear of
terrorism ( Terrorism, p. 178).
. The argument begins with a survey of historical abuses of the FBI's
investigative powers. In this vein, the authors relate not j ust the
familiar stories of the McCarthy and Vietnam eras - this they do with
engaging details relating to less-well-known victims of aggressive

43. Cole, The New McCarthyism, supra note 15, at 1-2.
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investigations, such as Frank Wilkinson - but also the deeper history
of the FBl 's role as the lead agency for national security and intelli
gence investigations within the United States (Terrorism, pp. 71-89).
We may never have had a pure domestic intelligence service along
the lines of the United Kingdom's MIS service,44 but the responsibili
ties which would fall to such an agency (counterintelligence, counter
espionage, and counterterrorism) nonetheless have been with us for
quite some time and have been in the FBl 's bailiwick since its incep
tion. Cole and Dempsey shed much light on these early days, empha
sizing the efforts by Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone to confine
the Bureau to crime-related investigations and the subsequent
reemergence of noncriminal national security investigations in connec
tion with the threats posed by fascism and communism (Terrorism, pp.
71-72). We read about J. Edgar Hoover and the subversion investiga
tions, of course, and witness the FBl 's use of its investigative powers
to disrupt or discredit targets such as Martin Luther King, Jr. , and
leaders of the Vietnam War protest movement (Terrorism, pp. 72-76).
It all came to a head, famously, in the post-Watergate congres
sional investigation headed by Senator Frank Church (Terrorism, p.
76). With public revelations of investigative abuses came public out
rage, and with public outrage came political pressure to prevent fur
ther abuses. At this crucial j uncture, Attorney General Edward Levi
stepped in with two sets of new internal guidelines meant to constrain
the FBI and thus forestall a legislative effort to do the same.45
The first set dealt with the investigation of security threats
(including terrorism) of a purely domestic nature, requiring that the
FBI have an indication of possible criminal conduct before initiating a
preliminary inquiry in such cases.46 In the event the potential target
was a group advocating social or political change, moreover, Levi's
domestic guidelines would permit a full-fledged investigation to open
only if agents had "specific and articulable facts" indicating that the
group planned to achieve its ends through illegal means; mere suspi
cion was not enough to move beyond a preliminary inquiry.47 A

44. We may yet. See, e.g. , WILLIAM E. ODOM, FIXING INTELLIGENCE: FOR A MORE
SECURE AMERICA (2003) (recommending creation of a national counterintelligence serv
ice); A Review of the Relationship Between a Department of Homeland Security and the In
telligence Community: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't A ft., 107th Cong. 22
(2002) (testimony of Lt. Gen. William Odom, U.S. Army, ret.) (same).
45. See THE FBI: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE 38 (Athan G. Theoharis et
al. eds., 1999).
46. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON DOMESTIC SECURITY .
INVESTIGATIONS ( 1 976), reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings on S. 1612 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 18-26 (1978).
47. See THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at § 1; John T. Elliff,
The Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 798
(1984).
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second set, which was classified, dealt with the same issues in the con
text of security and intelligence investigations concerning the activities
of foreign powers.48
Developments at the federal level were paralleled, moreover, at
the local level. In a series of civil suits, plaintiffs in major cities such as
New York, San Francisco, and Chicago challenged the intelligence
gathering activities of local police. These suits resulted in consent
decrees or even local ordinances that in various ways prohibited local
law enforcement from monitoring or otherwise collecting and main
taining information in the absence of criminal suspicion.49
The passage of time dulled the reform spirit while bringing to light
new security threats, however, and pressure soon mounted to slacken
the restrictions imposed by the Levi guidelines.50 In 1983 Attorney
General William French Smith revised the domestic guidelines some
what by replacing the "specific and articulable" standard with a
"reasonably indicated" test and, equally significantly, by authorizing
investigations to be opened based on a target's statements advocating
criminal activity or otherwise indicating the possibility of crime.51
According to the authors, the Guidelines were further weakened in
the aftermath of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing when the Justice
Department circulated an internal memorandum emphasizing that the
reasonable-indication standard for opening a full investigation is "sub
stantially lower than probable cause" and that a preliminary investiga
tion could be opened on a lesser showing (Terrorism, p. 82).
Cole and Dempsey conclude from this review that the "history of
the FBI has been one of an ongoing struggle between control and
discretion, between efforts to limit monitoring of political dissent and
efforts to preserve or extend FBI powers" (Terrorism, p. 89). And to
buttress this conclusion, the authors provide a series of lengthy
vignettes from more recent years.52 The vignettes are meant to show
48. See Athan G. Theoharis, FBI Surveillance: Past and Present, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
883, 889 (1 984) (citing JOHN T. ELLIFF, THE REFORM OF FBI INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
l33 (1979)).
49. TERRORISM, pp. 86-87, 95-98; see, e.g. , Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp.
2d 327, 329-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing the history of the consent decree governing po
lice investigation of political activity in New York City).
50. See THE FBI: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 45, at 40.
5 1 . THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING
ENTERPRISE AND DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS IJl.8.4.a (1983), reprinted in Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Mar. 7, 1 983). Declassified portions of Smith's foreign coun
terintelligence guidelines show that the factual predicate for such investigations was not the
target's illegal behavior but, instead, its status as an agent of a foreign power. See
ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND
FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS, available at www.fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/fbi/terrorismintel2.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2003).
52. Somewhat counterintuitively, the book actually opens with these vignettes and only
afterward discusses the earlier history.
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that even prior to what might be described as the age of terrorism {be
ginning with the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995), the FBI was taking
advantage of the slackening of restraints to engage in "security" inves
tigations that served primarily to harass or suppress political oppo
nents. In this spirit, we read of the FBI's vast but fruitless investigation
in the 1 980s of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El
Salvador ("CISPES"). Ronald Kessler has described the CISPES
investigation as "the modern bureau's most embarrassing case,"53 and
the authors' detailed account does much to explain why. The investi
gation began appropriately enough, with a tip from an informant
suggesting that CISPES was under the direction and control of a
Salvadoran rebel organization, and that its Dallas chapter intended to
carry out terrorism in America. The resulting investigation, however,
generated no corroboration for the tip. Yet the investigation contin
ued for years and spread nationwide. Most problematically, the inves
tigation consisted largely of monitoring perfectly legal but politically
unpopular speech by CISPES members, accompanied by extensive
file-keeping. Cole and Dempsey make a strong case that the investiga
tion might have continued further had Congress not begun to ask
questions about it in 1985.54
We also learn of the so-called "L.A. Eight," a group of legal aliens
and permanent residents who in the 1980s drew the FBI's attention as
a result of their advocacy in support of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine ("PFLP") ( Terrorism, pp. 35-44). The proce
dural history of the case is byzantine, but Cole knows it well, having
been counsel to the "Eight" in connection with the government's
numerous efforts to deport them.55 Their story is a good introduction
to the ways in which the immigration laws can be used to take action
against noncitizens on the basis of First Amendment activities. In
furtherance of this point, the authors emphasize the PFLP's social and
political functions but, surprisingly, the PFLP's history of terrorist
violence gets extremely short shrift ( Terrorism, pp. 40-41).56 Nonethe
less, the core lesson of the L.A. Eight story remains: the government

53. RONALD KESSLER, THE FBI 140 (1993).
54. TERRORISM. pp. 21-33. For another assessment which places the CISPES investiga
tion in context with the First Amendment concerns raised by the FBI's investigative powers,
see PHI LI P B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMONSENSE STRATEGY FOR A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 147-51 (1998).
55. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Patriot Act Used in 16-year-old Deportation Case; Administra
tion Revives 1987 Effort, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2003, at A3 (describing renewed efforts to
deport two of the eight).
56. The PFLP rose to prominence as a result of terrorist attacks it committed in the
1970s. See U.S. D EPT. OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 2001 , at 104. It has
become more active recently, as indicated by the assassination of an Israeli cabinet minister
in 2001. See id.; Richard Beeston, Terrorism Focus on Syria After Assassination, TIMES
(London), Oct. 18, 2001 , at 4.
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can and does act against noncitizens on the basis of otherwise pro
tected First Amendment activities.57
These and other vignettes from the 1980s and early 1990s do tend
to cast the FBI's investigative practices in a negative light, but not one
at all comparable to the abuses which took place in the prereform era
under Hoover. On the other hand, the 1980s and early 1990s were
relatively calm periods from the perspective of national security. And
today things are different. Beginning in the mid-1990s, and especially
since 9/11, the threat of terrorism in America has provided a powerful
justification for additional government action to enhance security.
The authors are aware of this, of course, and accordingly devote
the final third of the book to an exploration of how civil liberties have
faired in the age of terrorism. At this point the book's focus expands
considerably, no longer dealing exclusively with the subset of civil lib
erty concerns raised by the FBI's investigative powers. Instead, Cole
and Dempsey provide a sweeping critical survey of antiterrorism laws
and policies that have been adopted since the Oklahoma City bomb
ing in 1995 and 9/1 1 .
The first wave of heightened fears about terrorism within
the United States produced the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").58 And of the AEDPA provisions
discussed in Terrorism and the Constitution, none is more representa
tive of the authors' concerns than the material support law, § 2339B.59
As noted above, Cole and Dempsey contend that this law subtly resur
rects the unconstitutional principle of guilt by association ( Terrorism,
pp. 108-109, 121-123). This is an important argument in terms of as
sessing the merits of the adaptive-learning model. It is, after all,
premised on the claim that the government is seeking to avoid a par
ticular civil liberty protection generated during a prior time of height
ened security concerns. For this reason, and also because the argu
ment plays a central role in both Terrorism and the Constitution and in
Enemy Aliens, I discuss the merits of the guilt by association critique
in considerable detail in Part V.
Section 2339B is not the only aspect of AEDPA that troubles Cole
and Dempsey, however. They are equally concerned about the impact
of AEDPA on the immigration laws. The authors emphasize, for
example, what they describe as the resurrection of "ideological exclu-

57. In Enemy Aliens, this lesson becomes the premise for a warning - what the gov
ernment has done to aliens it eventually will attempt to do to citizens.
58. TERRORISM, pp. 1 13-15; see Pub. L. No. 1 04-132, 1 1 0 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in
scattered sections of the United States Code).
59. Tying their critique of § 2339B to Terrorism's focus on FBI investigative powers,
Cole and Dempsey point out that if § 2339B in fact criminalizes First Amendment activity
then the FBI is affirmatively authorized thereby to investigate such activity despite past
abuses. TERRORISM, pp. 122-23.
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sion" (Terrorism, pp. 123-124) . Throughout the Cold War, they ex
plain, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 had authorized exclusion of
aliens who were members of a communist organization.60 This anti
membership provision had been repealed in 1990, but AEDPA rein
stated it with "terrorist" substituting for "communist." To Cole and
Dempsey, this change - like the adoption of § 2339B - resorts to
guilt by association (Terrorism, pp. 123-125) .
After assessing these and other aspects of AEDPA, Cole and
Dempsey move their survey forward to confront the array of
antiterrorism measures that have emerged since 9/1 1 .6 1 Their critique
ranges widely, from the expansion of surveillance and investigative
powers under the USA PATRIOT Act,62 to the immigration sweeps
resulting in the detention of hundreds or perhaps thousands of Arab
and Muslim noncitizens, to the shroud of secrecy thrown over many of
these measures (Terrorism, pp. 151 -174). The authors pay particular
attention to the immigration measures in the USA PATRIOT Act,
noting that these provisions expand the use of the material support
concept to the deportation context, make advocacy of terrorism or a
terrorist organization a basis for exclusion, and provide for detention
of aliens pending removal based on the Attorney General's self
declared reasonable suspicion that an alien may be a terrorist
( Terrorism, pp. 153-158) .63 Cole and Dempsey also discuss the USA
PATRIOT Act's expansion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act ("PISA"), contending that by i ncreasing the range of cases in
which the FBI may resort to the PISA court for warrants - a proce
dure requiring probable cause to believe the target is an agent of a
foreign power, but not probable cause to believe a crime has been or is

60. TERRORISM, pp. 123-25; see Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at
8 u.s.c. §§ 1101-1189).
61 . This is significant because, while it would be difficult to make the case that 1996 was
a pathological period in which overriding security concerns blinded legislators to traditional
commitments to civil liberties, the immediate post-9111 environment arguably was different.
62. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub.L. No. 107-56, 1 1 5 Stat. 272. Dempsey
was among a coalition of civil liberties and privacy advocates intimately involved in the lob
bying effort against the USA PATRIOT Act, as memorably related by Robert 0. Harrow,
Jr., supra note 14.
63. The detention measure may be superfluous in practice, as officials are able to rely on
a combination of existing statutory authority and regulations promulgated after 9/11 to
achieve the same end without requiring the Attorney General to certify his suspicion that
the alien may be a terrorist. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000);
Review of Custody Determinations, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,909-02 (proposed Oct. 31, 2001) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3) (authorizing automatic stay of immigration judge's order of
release, pending appeal by the government, in all cases in which the government denied
release of the alien pending removal proceedings or where bond was set at $10,QOO or
higher); Interim Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334-35 (Sept. 17, 2001) (granting a "reasonable period
of time" beyond forty-eight hours to make a detention determination in the event of an
emergency).
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about to be committed - the law necessarily increased the extent to
which FBI investigations may interfere with First Amendment rights.64
But there are other post-9/11 measures unrelated to the USA
PATRIOT Act that also draw criticism. Chief among them is the
arrest and detention of hundreds if not thousands of Arab and Muslim
men in the aftermath of the attack. Combined with other measures
such as the FBI's attempt to interview some 5000 men from certain
Arab and Muslim countries, the authors see a pattern of ethnic and
religious profiling which they contend cannot withstand strict scrutiny
analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.65 Cole and Dempsey also
contend that civil liberties in general have been degraded in a broad
but subtle fashion by the administration's efforts to maintain secrecy
with respect to many aspects of its antiterrorism efforts ( Terrorism,
pp. 172-174).
At the conclusion of this survey, the authors shift the focus back to
the narrower questions raised by the FBI's national-security investiga
tive powers. Cole and Dempsey explain that in keeping with the
historical patterns described earlier in the book, the antiterrorism
measures of 1996 and 2001 "adopted a political approach to terrorism"
( Terrorism, p. 187). The FBI, they conclude, "must get out of the busi
ness of monitoring political activity and associations, foreign and
domestic, and instead dedicate itself to the urgent task of identifying
those planning violent activities" ( Terrorism, p. 187). The problem, of
course, is that there are circumstances in which the task of identifying
those planning violent activities would be advanced by monitoring
expressive activity. Philip Heymann captured the tension well when he
wrote that:
[a] crucial protection for political dissent is the assurance that the gov
ernment will not monitor private or public meetings of a group sharply
criticizing the government. But when such groups urge violence as a re
sponse to their criticisms, monitoring their membership and activities
may be important to early discovery of extremely dangerous political
violence.66

64. TERRORISM, pp. 159-61. The assessment is not entirely negative, however. Cole and
Dempsey acknowledge, for example, the propriety of the USA PATRI OT Act provision
that for the first-time grants the CIA limited access to grand jury information, although they
object to the provision's lack of judicial oversight. TERRORISM, p. 162; see also Jennifer M.
Collins, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Sharing Grand Jury Information With the
Intelligence Community Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261 (2002)
(proposing additional record-keeping and ex ante judicial approval requirements).
65. TERRORISM, pp. 1 68-71. For a careful analysis of the profiling issue post-9/11, see
Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1413 (2002).
66. See HEYMANN, supra note 54, at 151. Writing prior to 9/1 1 , Heymann concluded that
"the limited threat to uninhibited discussion posed by even reasonable efforts to monitor
organizations preaching violence is a price worth paying to prevent political violence." Id.
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In view of this tension, the task of drawing an appropriate line
between legitimate and illegitimate investigative activity is an im
mensely difficult one. But in any event the trend in the months since
publication of Terrorism and the Constitution is away from rather than
toward the adoption of new restraints. In May 2002, Attorney General
Ashcroft announced significant revisions to the guidelines regulating
FBI investigations of domestic security threats, explaining that "the
war against terrorism is the central mission and highest priority of the
FBI," that "terrorism prevention is the key objective under the revised
guidelines," and that "the FBI must draw proactively on all lawful
sources of information to identify terrorist threats and activities. "67
Accordingly, the new guidelines affirmatively authorize agents to
"scour public sources for information on future terrorist threats" even
in the absence of "specific investigative predicates."68 Similarly, " [f]or
the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist activities, the FB I is
authorized to visit any place and attend any event that is open to the
public, on the same terms and conditions as members of the public
generally. "69 In addition, changes were made to the rules regarding
preliminary inquiries to ensure that agents are authorized to collect
information about suspected terrorist groups even in the absence of
sufficient evidence to open a formal investigation.70
The tension between these developments and civil liberties con
cerns is symptomatic of a broader conflict. As a society, we expect 67. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks on the Attorney General's Guidelines,
(May 30, 2002) available at www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/05/ag053002.html (May 30, 2002).
68. Id.
69. Id. Writing in another context, Dempsey has pointed out that these changes affect
only investigations of purely domestic threats, and that the revisions do not relate to parallel
(but much less restrictive) guidelines for terrorism threats posed by foreign entities such as
Al Qaeda. See Jerry Berman & James X. Dempsey, Center for Democracy and Technology,
CDT's Guide to the FBI Guidelines: Impact on Civ,il Liberties and Security - the Need for
Congressional Oversight (June 26, 2002), available at http://www.cdt.org/wiretap/020626
guidelines.shim.
70. See Fact Sheet, Attorney General's Guidelines: Detecting and Preventing Terrorist
Attacks, at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/53002factsheet.html. (May 30, 2002).
These changes were paralleled at the local level in New York and Chicago, where 1970s re
forms had produced, not self-regulation, but consent decrees sharply limiting the ability of
police to observe or investigate First Amendment activity. In early 2003, a federal judge
agreed to vacate the longstanding consent decree restricting New York City police after the
city adopted internal limitations in line with the new FBI Guidelines. See Handschu v. Spe
cial Services Div. , No. 71 CIV. 2203 (CSH), 2003 WL 1529197 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2003);
Handschu v. Special Services Div., No. 71 CIV. 2203 (CSH), 2003 WL 302258 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
13, 2003); see also Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir.
2001) (modifying Chicago consent decree so as to permit monitoring of potential terrorists in
certain situations). But cf Andrea Dukakis, Denver Residents Surprised by Police Files Kept
on Political A ctivists, NPR MORNING EDITION, Feb. 25, 2003, 2003 WL 4856338 (describing
Denver police practice of monitoring and maintaining files relating to political activities
without connection to criminal suspicion or security threats); Associated Press, Denver Po
lice Settle Lawsuit Over Secret Files, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 18, 2003, at A-12 (de
scribing settlement between Denver and the ACLU constraining this practice).
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we demand - that the government take effective measures not j ust to
convict those who commit terrorist acts, but also to prevent terrorist
acts from occurring in the first place. There is public outcry when the
government fails in the latter capacity, demanding to know why the
government did not do more.71 At the same time, we also expect and
demand that the government will carry out this responsibility within
constitutional boundaries, including restraints preserving freedom of
expression and association. These competing demands produce an
inherent dilemma, and Cole and Dempsey would resolve it by apply
ing a traditional criminal law enforcement paradigm to antiterrorism
investigations.72 The contrast with the terrorism prevention paradigm
actually adopted by the Administration is sharp. Even those who
disagree with the authors' recommendations will find that Terrorism
and the Constitution makes a valuable contribution by marshaling the
civil liberties objections to the prevention paradigm and placing them
in historical perspective.
IV. ENEMY ALIENS: BREAKING THE GOLDEN RULE
Much has happened on the legal front of the war on terrorism
since Terrorism and the Constitution was published in early 2002, and
many of these developments are addressed in Enemy Aliens: Double
Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. But
Enemy Aliens is not merely an updated version of Terrorism and the
Constitution. It also is an elaborate and thought-provoking argument
about the manner in which the balance between liberty and security
impacts noncitizens.
The heart of Cole's argument is that a double standard pervades
our approach to striking the balance between liberty and security. He
explains that
[w]hen a democratic society strikes the balance between liberty and secu
rity in ways that impose the costs of security measures equally on all, one
might be relatively confident that the political process will achieve a
proper balance. Since September 1 1 , we have repeatedly done precisely
the opposite, sacrificing the rights of a minority group - noncitizens, and

especially Arab and Muslim noncitizens - in the name of the majority's
security interests.

(Enemy Aliens, p. 5)

To Cole, this tradeoff is inherently unconstitutional, unethical, and
counterproductive. Worse still, he argues, the tradeoff is illusory
71. See, e.g. , John J. Goldman, 9111 Commission Urged to Find Answers; Those Whose
Lives Were Deeply Affected by the Tragedy Testify, Demand Accountability, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. l , 2003, at A19.
72. "All antiterrorism investigations in the United States, whether of foreign or domes
tic groups, should be conducted pursuant to criminal rules, with the goal of arresting people
planning, supporting, or carrying out violent activities and convicting them in a court of
law." TERRORISM, p. 186.
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because the deprivations imposed upon noncitizens serve as prece
dents for the government later to strip the same rights from citizens"
(Enemy Aliens, pp. 7-9). "Virtually every significant government secu
rity initiative implicating civil liberties - including penalizing speech,
ethnic profiling, guilt by association, the use of administrative meas
ures to avoid the safeguards of the criminal process, and preventive
detention - has originated in a measure targeted at noncitizens"
(Enemy Aliens, p. 85). In the end, Cole warns, our willingness to vio
late the Golden Rule leaves us with an expanded national security
state, a diminished sphere of private autonomy, and even less security.
Cole builds this critique on historical foundations, providing a
survey laden with personal detail in support of his thesis.73 His discus
sion of detention without an individualized showing of dangerousness
provides a good example. Cole points out that this type of detention
- what we might call group detention - originated in 1798 with the
Enemy Alien Act.74 That law, which remains on the books today,
authorizes the executive branch during times of declared war to detain
or deport at its discretion any citizens of an enemy nation who may
happen to be in the United States.75 The law does not require an indi
vidual showing that the detained or deported alien poses a danger; it is
enough that the alien is a citizen of our military opponent.76
For the next 150 years, group detention remained a security meas
ure available only against noncitizens. But this changed during the
Second World War as a result of the notorious decision to imprison
wholesale not only Japanese citizens but also Japanese-Americans,
without any showing of individual dangerousness.77 As Cole points
out, race served as a bridge to cross the citizen/noncitizen divide in
that instance (Enemy Aliens, pp. 95-98). And shortly after World War
II, the possibility of citizens being subjected to group detention
emerged again in connection with a Justice Department program to
identify suspected communists whom the government might detain in
the event the president declared a national emergency in connection
with the communist threat (Enemy Aliens, pp. 100-102).
73. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 85-179. Some portions of this history will be familiar to readers
of Terrorism and the Constitution
such as the story of the L.A. 8 - but on the whole there
is remarkably little overlap between these two books.
-

74. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 91-104; see Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, §§ 1-3, 1 Stat. 577 (codi
fied at 50 U .S.C. §§ 21 (2000)).
75. The Enemy Alien Act was used frequently up through the Second World War, but
as we no longer formally declare wars its importance has decreased considerably over the
past fifty years.
76. See Enemy Alien Act § 1 .
77. See Korematsu v . United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affirming conviction for defi
ance of the military's exclusion order); PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983); ERIC L.
MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
DRAFT RESISTERS IN WORLD WAR II (2001).
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In another example of historical linkages between measures
directed at noncitizens and citizens, Cole points to the changes in the
immigration laws in 1903 that authorized tl:ie. exclusion of aliens who
advocated or believed in the illegal overthrow of government (Enemy
Aliens, p. 107). He notes that a proposal to criminalize such advocacy
by citizens was rejected at the time, only to resurface successfully
during the World War I era in the form of the infamous Sedition Act
in 1918, as well as in various state antisyndicalism laws (Enemy Aliens,
pp. 107-08, 112). Similarly, Cole observes that the 1903 exclusion law
was amended in 1917 to require exclusion of aliens who were members
of organizations promoting the illegal overthrow of government.78
Describing this as a form of guilt by association, Cole contends that
the 1917 immigration law set a precedent that the government would
use in later years to punish citizens for their association with commu
nist groups (Enemy Aliens, pp. 106-07, 130-32). And in a more recent
example, Cole points to the fact that "material support" became a
basis for excluding aliens from the United States before it became a
criminal act for citizens (Enemy Aliens, pp. 60-61).
Not everyone will come away convinced by these observations that
it is inherently illegitimate for society to concentrate a security meas
ure on noncitizens, however illegitimate it might be to do so in a
particular case. One important objection is that some security threats
- Al Qaeda comes to mind - emanate from abroad. In such circum
stances, where the threat is posed primarily if not exclusively by non
citizens, crafting a security measure to target such noncitizens may be
a reasoned response rather than a mere expedient creating a false
impression of enhanced security.79 Another obj ection, limited to secu
rity measures in the immigration context, derives from the fact that
the "Supreme Court has staked out a role of extreme deference to the
political branches' 'plenary power' . over immigration. "80 The plenary
power doctrine "carves out a unique space in American public law: a
realm where the Constitution does not· always apply."81 On this theory,
there are at least some security steps the government may take in the
immigration context which cannot also be taken with respect to citi-

78. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 109-10. This was' a' major expansion of the government's exclu
sionary power given the relative difficulty of showing that an alien had advocated a . particu
lar belief, and the relative ease of showing membership in a group to whom such ideas could
be attributed.
·

79. Cole acknowledges this concern, but contends it is outweighed by a quartet of con
siderations: maintaining a "double standard," in his view, is undesirable because it cannot be
maintained in the long run; will be counterproductive; contributes to government overreac
tion; and is both illegal and immoral. See ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 6-7.
80. Margaret H. Taylor, Detained A liens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the
Porous Border of the Plenary Power Dodrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1091 (1995).
81. Id. at 1 127.
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zens.82 Notwithstanding these objections, Cole clearly succeeds in
drawing attention to the inherent political vulnerability of noncitizens
and their resulting susceptibility to scapegoating during times of
heightened security concerns.
And what of the second stage of Cole's thesis, which contends that
deprivations of noncitizens' rights serve as templates for extending the
same deprivations to citizens? If correct, this argument is in consider
able tension with the social-learning model described above. The
template argument implies, after all, that calibration errors do not
shrink over time but, on the contrary, spread from the realm of aliens
to citizens. There are reasons . to hesitate, however, before accepting
this proposition.
Some readers will not be persuaded that a causal relationship
exists between repressive measures applied to aliens and those later
applied to citizens. Consider the purported connection between the
Enemy Alien Act and the Japanese internments of the Second World
War. As Cole himself observes, the Enemy Alien Act was on the
books - and frequently used - for a century and a half before the
group-identity concept it embodied was extended to citizens (Enemy
Aliens, pp. 91-93) . This is a long latency period to support a causal
connection. And even where the interval is shorter there nonetheless
remain questions about the mechanism or dynamic purportedly link
ing the two instances, as with the adoption of material support as a
ground for excluding aliens in 1990 and the criminalization of material
support four years later.
Perhaps more significantly, there are counterexamples in which the
civil liberties of citizens were sacrificed without a noncitizen prece
dent, or prior to the extension of a suppressive measure from nonciti
zens to citizens. Consider the notorious Sedition Act of 1798.83 Under
that infamous law, many citizens were prosecuted during the Adams
Administration for political dissent (or less) notwithstanding their
First Amendment rights.84 And extensive · repression of dissenting
political speech also occurred before the Civil War with respect to

82. Outside the immigration context, however, the " 'aliens' rights' tradition" controls.
Id. at 1091. This means that "aliens enjoy a full panoply of constitutional rights" in most non
immigration contexts. Id. In this vein, Cole devotes consideraJ?le text to a discussion of the
rights of aliens under both the federal constitution and international law. ENEMY ALIENS,
pp. 21 1 -27.
83. Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 2, l 'Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801); see also CURTIS,
supra note 18, at 58-79 (describing the background
and legislative history of the Sedition
.
Act).
84. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274-76 (1964) (discussing criticism of
the Sedition Act and concluding that "the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the
court of history"); CURTIS, supra note 18, at 80-104 (discussing prosecutions under the Sedi
tion Act).
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abolitionists, and during the Civil War with respect to opponents of
the war.85
But regardless of whether one is per�uaded by Cole's description
of the historical cycle, his criticisms of post-9/11 antiterrorism meas
ures remain to be addressed. In keeping with his theme Cole begins by
arguing that "the government has not asked American citizens to sac
rifice their liberty . . . [but instead] has asked those . . . who are not in a
position to decline the offer because they have no voice in the demo
cratic process" (Enemy Aliens, p. 21). As a consequence, the "war on
terrorism has been waged largely through anti-immigrant measures"
(Enemy Aliens, p. 21).
Chief among these, Cole contends, is the pretextual use of immi
gration law to implement a system of preventive detention for nonciti
zens, and in particular for Arab and Muslim noncitizens.86 According
to a report by the Justice Department's Office of the Inspector
General, between September 1 1 , 2001 and August 6, 2002, the FBI
detained 762 noncitizens for immigration violations in connection with
the 9/11 investigation.87 In each case, the INS was obliged to keep cus,
tody of the noncitizen - even those who agreed to voluntary deporta
tion (Enemy Aliens, pp. 32-33) - until the FBI was satisfied the indi
vidual was not in fa<:;t involved in terrorism.88 This process took eighty
days on average.89 Ultimately, only a handful of these detainees were

85. See CURTIS, supra note 1 8, at 125-54, 260-63, 289-99 (discussing suppression of aboli
tionist speech); id. at 300-56 (discussing suppressiOn of antiwar speech).
86. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 24-25:

Because our economy literally depends on illegal immigration, we have long tolerated the
presence of literally millions of noncitizens who have violated some immigration rule. This
means the attorney general has extremely broad discretion in how and when to enforce im
migration obligations; any immigrant community he targets will inevitably include many per
sons here in violation of their' visas. In this sense, the immigration law functions largely as
does the traffic law for drug law enforcement; it affords a convenient pretext for targeting
millions of individuals. And just as the traffic laws facilitated "driving while black" enforce
ment, so the immigration law has permitted ethnic profiling.
87. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, u:s. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 1 1
DETAINEES: A REVIEW O F THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS
(April 2003 ) , at 2 [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT] . Cole points out that in ad
dition to those detained in connection with.the 9/11 investigation, the Justice Department by
January 2003 "had also reportedly detained and deport.ed some 1 ,100 more foreign nationals

under the Absconder Apprehension lnitfative, which expressly targets for deportation Arabs
and Muslims with outstanding deportation orders, among the more than 300,000 foreign na
tionals living here with such orders. As of May 2003, another 2,747 noncitizens had been de
tained in connection with a Special Registration program also directed at Arab and Muslim
noncitizens." ENEMY ALIENS, p. 25.
88. INSPECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 87, at 37-71.
89. Id. at 52.
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deemed to have any connection with terrorism, prompting Cole to
declare the preventive-detention program a "colossal failure. "90
Cole also takes aim at the veil of secrecy placed over these immi
gration proceedings, drawing effectively on his experience as counsel
for one such detainee (Enemy Aliens, pp. 26-30). He writes that
" [p]ublic disclosures not only might have increased objections to the
government's measures, but, given that the widely cast net came up
empty, would almost certainly have impaired confidence in the job our
government was doing to protect us" (Enemy Aliens, p. 30). "The real
concern," he suggests, "may have been not that Al Qaeda would find
out what was going on, but that the American public would find out"
(Enemy Aliens, p. 30).
But Cole does not limit himself to those aspects of the war on ter
rorism which relate to immigration law. He devotes equal attention
and criticism to issues such as the government's use of the material
witness statute to detain individuals on grounds Cole views as pretex
tual (Enemy Aliens, pp. 35-39), and the government's decision to des
ignate as "enemy combatants" American citizens Yaser Hamdi and
Jose Padilla.91 Cole then shifts his attention from detention to detec
tion, dealing first with the vexing issues surrounding racial-, religious-,
and national origin-based methods of profiling (Enemy Aliens, pp. 4756). He also discusses the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,92 criti
cizing the recent decision by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance

90. ENEMY ALIENS, p. 25-26. Consistent with the adaptive-learning model, Cole inter
prets the 9/11 detentions as confirmation of the government's recidivist tendencies. He con
cedes that "Arabs and Muslims have not been interned en masse in the wake of September
11 in the way that the Japanese were during World War II," but raises the question whether
"that is because we have learned our lesson, or [because] the political forces are not suffi
cient to sustain such a strategy?" ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 103-04. In a similar vein, Cole has
compared the 9/11 detentions to the infamous "Palmer Raids" which resulted in the arrest of
thousands of noncitizens following a string of anarchist bombings in 1919. See ENEMY
ALIENS, pp. 117-28, 179 (describing the Palmer Raids and linking them to current
antiterrorism policies); David Cole, We've Aimed, Detained, and Missed Before, WASH.
POST, June 8, 2003, at Bl ("Then, as now, the·government went into 'preventive' mode, and
exploited immigration law to sweep broadly.a�d blindly."). On the other hand, the very exis
tence of the Inspector General's Report - and in particular the Department's apparent ac
ceptance of substantially all of its recommendations - demonstrates the presence of iristitu
tional safeguards that did not exist during these eariier periods. See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Will
Tighten Rules on Holding Terror Suspects, N.Y: TIMES, June 13, 2003, at Al. I n any event,
the j udgment that the program was a "colossal failure" assumes something we cannot know
- that the detentions served no prevel).tive purpose except with respect to the handful of
cases positively linked to terrorism.
91. ENEMY ALIENS, pp. 39-46. On June 23, 2003, the Bush Administration designated a
third man - Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri, a Qatari in the United States on a student visa as an enemy combatant. See Josh Meyer, Suspect Declared an Enemy Combatant, L.A.
TIMES, June 24, 2003, at Al .
92. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 , 1820-1829,
1841-1846, 1861-1863 (2000).
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Court of Review upholding the Justice Department's interpretation of
that law.93
Although Cole's survey of the tools of. antiterrorism policy ranges
over a wide array of topics, there is a common thread that unites much
of the discussion: the tension between national security concerns and
freedom of association, and in particular the government's use of guilt
by association to achieve security goals. Cole explains that he has
devoted much of his career "to defending foreign nationals targeted
for their alleged political associations in cases raising national security
claims and allegations of terrorist ties" (Enemy Aliens, p. 87). This
long-standing interest manifests itself throughout both Enemy Aliens
and Terrorism and the Constitution, nowhere more so than in discus
sions of laws such as § 2339B punishing the provision of material sup
port to designated foreign terrorist organizations (Enemy Aliens, pp.
18, 58-64, 75-79, 230; Terrorism, pp. 118-125, 140-142, 152-155). These
discussions are representative of . the arguments in both books, and
they shed some light on the relative validity of the adaptive- and so
cial-learning models. Accordingly, I devote the remaining pages to a
close examination of Cole's· argument that § 2339B surreptitiously
resurrects the unconstitutional principle of guilt by association.94
V.

GUILT BY A SSOCIATION AND MATERIAL S UPPORT

The guilt by association . critique of § 2339B rests on the fact that
the statute punishes the provision of material support to designated
foreign terrorist organizations ("DFTOs") without regard · to whether
the supporter specifically intended thereby to fµrther any illegal

93 . ENEMY ALIENS, p: 58-64; see In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (F.I.S.C.R. 2002) (re
versing In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 61 1 (F.I.S.C. 2002)). Notably, James Dempsey was among the attorneys on one of
the amicus briefs supporting the lower court's decision. See Brief on Behalf of Amici Curiae
American Civil Liberties Union et al. In Support of Affirmance, In re Appeal from July 9,
2002 Opinion of the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Nci. 02-001),
available at www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/091902FISCRbrief.pdf.
94. In Part V, I do not address another significant constitutional objection to § 2339B
discussed in both books: whether the material support statutory scheme denies due process
either to defendants or to the proscribed o'rganizations in the course of the designation proc
ess. Compare Nat') Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir.
2001 ) (holding that the designation process denied due process of law to designated organi
zations), and United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (relying on
National Council of Resistance to hold that § 2339B prosecution premised on unconstitu
tional designation cannot proceed) (appeal pending), with 32 County Sovereignty Comm. v.
Dep't of State, 292 F.3d 797 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (foreign entity without property or presence in
the U.S. lacks due process rights to challenge desig11ation), and United States v. Sattar, 272
F. Supp. 2d 348, 363-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting the holding in Rahmani and denying due
process challenge); cf Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57
(D.D.C. 2002) (rejecting due process challenge to a similar designatf on process under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act), affd, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (same).
.
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conduct; the statute's intent element requires only that the defendant
knew that the support was being rendered to the DFT0.95 Citing this
feature, the authors · in both. books draw an analogy between § 2339B
and an array of measures undertaken by the government during the
Cold War in an effort to suppress the threat posed by communism
(Terrorism, pp. 118-119, 154; Enemy Aliens, pp. 58-64). Those
anticommunist measures similarly lacked an intent requirement, anq
as a result the Supreme Court in a series of landmark decisions struck
them down on the ground that they amounted to punishment on the
basis of guilt by · association.96 According to the authors, § 2339B
operates "under the guise · of cutting off funding for terrorism"
precisely in order to avoid this constitutional restraint.97
This claim is significantly overstated. The measures which gave rise
to the prohibition of guilt by association purposefully suppressed
advocacy of · communist doctrines and, especially, membership in
communist organizations. In contrast, § 2339B in most respects is a
content-neutral law which burdens First Amendment rights only inci
dentally. In this respect, § 2339B is akin tO laws authorizing embarg9es
of hostile. foreign states or' restricting the export of certain items to
them. Such laws may implicate First Amendment considerations, of
course, but they do not thereby trigger the same degree of j udicial
scrutiny as would a measure intentionally targeting expression.
The guilt by association critique is not entirely wide of the mark,
however. The array of activities constituting "material support" ranges
widely, and includes "personnel." A close examination reveals that the
government interprets this term to encompass the act of providing
one's self as a member of a DFTO, so long as one is subject to the
DFTO's direction and control.98 This status-based prohibition differs
saliently from the other, conduct-based aspects of the material support
definition. More to the point, this interpretation directly implicates the
Cold War precedents upon which the guilt by association critique
rests. In those limited instances where the government proceeds under
§ 2339B on the theory that a defendant provided himself or herself as
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339b (a)(l) (2000) (Whoever . . . "knowingly provides .material sup
port or resource to a foreign terrorist organ,ization" violates the statµte). By way of example,
this knowledge requirement ensures that a p�r�on cannot be prosecuted under § 2339B for
giving money to a charity that unbeknownst to the donor passes the money to a terrorist
group.
96.· See infra notes 106-118 and accompanying text.
97. TERRORISM, p. 153. In keeping with t)le theme. of Enemy A liens, Cole points out
that the first material support law was e.nacted not in the criminal law context but instead in
the immigration law context. ENEMY ALIENS, 75. The Immigration Act of 1990 provided
'
that an alien could be excluded from the U nited Sta tes if he or she had engaged in conduct
which the alien knew or should have known would provide "material support" to a person,
group, or government engaged iµ terrorism . See 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000) (as
amended by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)).
.

98. See infra notes 127-132 and accompanying text.
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personnel to a DFTO, therefore, the statute should be interpreted to
require proof of the defendant's intent to facilitate illegal conduct.99
I explain these conclusions in more detail below. But first I attempt
to clarify what it means to argue that a law resurrects "guilt by associa
tion," because the phrase turns out to be more complex than expected.
For similar reasons, I also look closely at the meaning of "material
support." Both clarifications play an important role in the assessment
of the authors' argument.
A.

The Meaning of Guilt by Association

" Guilt by association" is an umbrella concept that encompasses
two distinct methods of government regulation that concern the
relationship of one person to another or to a group. One method could
be termed "vicarious punishment." In this sense, guilt by association
refers to punishment of A for specific actions committed by B. The
second method could be termed "criminalized association." Here, the
government punishes A not for any specific conduct by B, but for
associating with B.
Conspiracy law provides an illustration of the distinction between
the two concepts. The punishment of conspiracy itself is an example of
criminalized association; the law seeks to discourage the formation of
groups associated for criminal purposes because such associations
"make possible the attainment of ends more complex than those
which one criminal could accomplish. "100 But separate and apart from
the punishment conspirators face for their association with one
another, conspirators may also face vicarious punishment for the spe
cific criminal acts of their coconspirators pursuant to the Pinkerton
doctrine.1 0 1
Vicarious punishment is not entirely alien to our system, as the
existence of the Pinkerton doctrine demonstrates.102 But vicarious
99. Insofar as a defendant did in fact become a member of a DFTO subject to its direc
tion and control, the burden of this mens rea requirement by no means will preclude prose
cution. Evidence of the DFTO's illegal activities and the defendant's awareness of them may
be enough for a jury to infer the requisite intent.
100. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961). For a thorough discussion of
the rationale behind conspiracy law, see Neal Kumar Katya!, Conspiracy Theory, 1 12 YALE
L.J. 1307 (2003).
101. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (holding that conspirator can
be liable for reasonably foreseeable actions of co-conspirator committed in furtherance of
their jointly agreed illegal end); see also Katya!, supra note 100 at 1372-75. Justice Scalia
referred to this form of guilt by association when he wrote recently that "[t]here is no guilt
by association . . . enabling the sovereignty .of one State to be abridged under § 5 of the Four
teenth Amendment because of violation by another State or by most other States, or even by
49 other States." Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
102. For an illuminating discussion of the instrumental value of vicarious punishment,
see Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
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punishment nonetheless clashes sharply with our commitments to due
process of law and freedom of association.103 As Justice Stevens wrote
in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., " [t]he right to associate does
not lose all constitutional protection merely because some members of
the group may have participated in conduct or advocated doctrine that
itself is not protected."104
If § 2339B were a vicarious punishment statute operating on a
principle analogous to the Pinkerton doctrine, its failure to require
proof that the defendant intended to further any illegal conduct would
render it unconstitutional. But § 2339B is not a vicarious punishment
statute; it does not authorize punishment of one person for the con
duct of someone else.105 If the statute does involve guilt by association,
therefore, it must be in the second sense of that phrase - criminalized
association.
Attempts to criminalize association were frequent during the
struggle with communism, and as a result a well-developed body of
First Amendment doctrine formed · reflecting a j udgment about the
acceptable parameters of the concept.106 The Supreme Court first
addressed this issue in De Jonge v. Oregon, in which Oregon prose
cuted a man under its syndicalism law for helping to organize a public
meeting of the Communist Party in 1934.107 The Supreme Court held
103. "[W]e have no tradition of imputed guilt in our legal system, and we ordinarily
recoil at the notion of guilt by association." Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate
Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 319 (1996); see also United States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d 1 120,
1 124 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting potential due process limitations on the Pinkerton doctrine in
cases involving attenuated relationships between the conspirator and the substantive crime);
Blasi, supra note 25, at 496 ("Even when a member actively participates in the affairs of an
organization and knows about and shares its illegal objectives, vicarious criminal responsi
bility for the speeches and writings of others is not warranted.").
104. 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982) (holding that individuals and organizations involved in an
otherwise legal boycott could not be held liable for the illegal conduct of other participants
in the boycott); see also Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961):
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or
conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to
other concededly criminal activity . . . , that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to
satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
105. As Vincent Blasi has explained,
[c]riminal responsibility should not be considered "vicarious" when it is based on specifically
defined conduct by the defendant, including verbal solicitation to illegal advocacy, that is
prohibited because of its significant causal connection to harmful consequences. The type of
liability that is problematic under the pathological perspective is that which permits persons
to be convicted for nothing more than failing to prevent, repudiate, report, or disassociate
themselves from the illegal advocacy of their political associates.
Blasi, supra note 25, at 496 n.162 (emphasis added).
106. For a thorough and thoughtful review of the role that American communism
played in developing these principles, see Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment:
The Shaping of Freedom ofA dvocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1991).
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that the prosecution violated De Jonge's assembly and petition rights,
observing that
[t]hose who assist in the conduct of [peaceable] meetings cannot be
branded as criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the aus
pices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the
relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the
bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.108

Notwithstanding De Jonge, three years later Congress enacted the
Alien Registration Act, also known as the Smith Act.1 09 This law, in
relevant part, criminalized membership in any organization advocating
the forcible and illegal overthrow of government, without regard to
the member's intent to further any illegal conduct. 1 1 0 After World War
II, similar instances of criminalized association became central to a
wide of array of national, state, and local laws and policies aimed at
suppressing the Communist Party. Eventually, in Scales v. United
States, the Supreme Court weighed in on the constitutional questions
raised by the Smith Act's membership prohibition. 1 11
The Court in Scales did not actually declare the membership provi
sion unconstitutional, but did restrain its scope dramatically in order
to confine it to constitutional bounds. The key to the decision was
Justice Harlan's distinction between traditional criminal conspiracies
and what might be called "hybrid groups" - those with legal and
illegal functions. 1 12 Justice Harlan conceded the government's power

107. 299 U.S. 353 (1937). The case had elements of both forms of guilt by association. It
involved vicarious punishment in that prosecutors put on proof that party members had
broken the syndicalism law at other meetings. And it involved criminalized association in
that De Jonge was charged with nothing more than "assist[ing] in the conduct of a public
meeting, albeit otherwise lawful, which was held under the auspices of the Communist
Party." De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 362.
108. Id. at 365.
109. Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (codified with some differences
in language at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2003)).
1 1 0. See id. , stating in relevant part that:
[w] h oever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of per·
sons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any . . . government
by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of. or affiliates with, any such society, group,
or assembly or persons, knowing the purposes thereof" shall be subject to a sentence of up to
twenty years, a fine of up to $20,000, and shall remain ineligible for e mployment by the fed·
era! government for five years from the date of conviction. (emphasis added).

1 1 1 . 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
1 1 2. Scales, 367 U.S. at 229. An organization may be hybrid despite being predominately
legitimate. Consider the boycott of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Missis
sippi, at issue in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. , 458 U.S. 886 (1982). Indisputably, the
boycotters in large part acted within their rights in pursuit of admirable goals of racial justice
and equality, but there were occasional instances of illegal conduct as well. Justice Stevens
put it best when he wrote that the boycott "included elements of criminality and elements of
majesty." Id. at 888.
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to criminalize association in the context of an ordinary criminal
conspiracy, notwithstanding associational rights.113 A "blanket prohibi
tion of association with a group having both legal and illegal aims," on
the other hand, would pose "a real danger that legitimate political
expression or association would be impaired. " 1 14
Justice Harlan's point was not that the government lacked power
to criminalize association with a hybrid group; it was that this power
must be narrowly circumscribed in order to avoid undue interference
with legitimate expression and association. Thus he concluded that the
government could not punish membership in a hybrid group without
"clear proof that a defendant 'specifically intend[s] to accomplish [the
aims of the organization] by resort to violence. ' "115 As to
the member for whom the organization is a vehicle for the advancement
of legitimate aims and policies[, that individual] does not fall within the
ban of the statute: he lacks the requisite specific intent to bring about the
overthrow of the government as speedily as circumstances would permit.
Such a person may be foolish, deluded, or perhaps merely optimistic, but
he is not by this statute made a criminal. 1 1 6

Construing the membership provision to contain a specific intent
restriction, the Supreme Court upheld the law.117
In a string of subsequent decisions addressing measures suppress
ing membership in communist groups, the Supreme Court repeatedly
reaffirmed the Scales holding.1 18 Taken together these cases establish a
constitutional litmus test for laws that criminalize association with a
hybrid group. Does the law require proof that the defendant specifi
cally intended to further the illegal ends of the organization? If not,
then the law sweeps within its grasp too much innocent association. It
1 13. See Scales, 367 U .S. at 229.
1 14. Id.
1 15. Id. (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961) (Noto was a companion
decision issued the same day as Scales)).
1 16. Id. at 229-30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 17. Id. at 222-24, 229-30.
1 18. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (striking down regulatory
scheme in which membership in a "subversive" organization provided grounds for dismissal
of any public school employee); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 260, 265 (1967) (striking
down provision of the Subversive Activities Control Act making it illegal for members of a
"Communist-action organization" to be employed in defense-related facility in certain cir
cumstances, and observing that the "statute quite literally establishes guilt by association
alone, without any need to establish that an individual's association poses the threat feared
by the Government in proscribing it"); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 1 1 , 17 (1966) (striking
down law which punished public officials who took oath of office but who knowingly became
or remained member of communist group; " (!Jaws such as this which are not restricted in
scope to those who join with the 'specific intent' to further illegal action impose, in effect, a
conclusive presumption that the member shares the unlawful aims of the organization");
Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U .S. 500, 5 1 1 (1964) (striking down statute precluding mem
bers of a communist organization from obtaining passports for lack of a specific intent ele
ment).
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is, in short, a matter of narrow tailoring. But does § 2339B criminalize
association in this respect? The question is crucial, because § 2339B
purposefully does not require proof of specific intent to further illegal
conduct.119
B.

The Meaning of Material Support

In contrast to the Smith Act membership provision discussed
above, § 2339B on its face does not prohibit membership in a DFfO.
Instead, it punishes anyone who "knowingly provides material suppor
tor resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or
conspires to do so. "120 The phrase "material support or resources" in
turn is defined to include any of the following: "currency or monetary
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training,
expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identi
fication, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal sub
stances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical
assets, except medicine or religious materials."121
For analytical purposes, this list can be divided into several catego
ries. First, material support includes funding (currency, monetary
instruments, and financial securities). Second, it includes a wide
variety of tangible equipment (false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, and other physical assets). Third, it includes certain serv
ices (financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance,
and transportation). Finally, it includes "personnel." The provision of
personnel might be taken as another form of service, but for reasons
explained below I will treat it as its own category for purposes of
assessing its relationship to the First Amendment.
The first year and a half since 9/11 has seen an unprecedented
wave of § 2339B prosecutions, accounting for each category of
material support described above.122 Funding is at issue, for example,
1 19. Section 23398 requires only that the defendant be aware that the recipient of the
support is a DFTO. This approach is intentional. Two years prior to the enactment of §
23398, Congress enacted a more limited material support law - 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. Section
2339A criminalizes material support only when the defendant knows or intends that the aid
will be used by the recipient (which need not be a DFTO) to further. specific criminal acts.
Critics argued that § 2339A was of little or no use in choking off the flow of aid from the
United States to foreign terrorist groups. See, e.g. , Todd Gillman, FBI Looks Into Islamic
Fund Raising; Muslim Officials Deny Supporting Terrorism, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov.
18, 1994, at 29A (citing unnamed diplomatic and law enforcement sources). This criticism,
combined with the political imperative created by the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, pro
duced § 23398 just two years later.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 23398(a)(l) (2000).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (incorporated by reference in 18 U.S.C. § 23398(g)(4)).
122. Section 23398 saw action on only four occasions in its first five years. See United
States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (describing pending prosecution of
seven men for providing funds to Mujaheddin-e Khalq (hereinafter "MEK"); David E.
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in the case against Mohammed Ali Hasan Al-Moayad, a Yemeni cleric
whom prosecutors allege has raised millions of dollars for both Al
Qaeda and Hamas.123 In other instances, the § 2339B charge turns on
the provision of equipment, as in the indictment of a group of men for
attempting to sell hashish and heroin to undercover agents in
exchange for "Stinger" anti-aircraft missiles which then would be pro
vided to Al Qaeda.124 A number of cases include allegations of mate
rial support in the form of services, as in the prosecution of Earnest
James Ujaama for conspiring to create and operate a training camp
and safehquses in the United States on behalf of Al Qaeda.125 Finally,
the § 2339B charges in several instances relate to the provision of

Kaplan & Monica M. Ekman, Homegrown Terrorists: How a Hezbo/lah Cell Made Millions
in Sleepy Charlotte, N. C., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 10, 2003 at 30 (describing the
prosecution of cigarette smuggling ring using funds to buy equipment for Hezbollah; the
prosecution resulted in the first jury convictions under § 2339B); John Mintz & Michael
Grunwald, FBI Terror Probes Focus on U.S. Muslims, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1998, at Al
(describing prosecution of Fawzi Mustapha Assi for providing GPS gear, nightvision goggles,
and infrared cameras; Assi absconded before trial); Press Release, United States Attorney's
Office, Central District of California (Oct. 26, 1 990) (describing prosecution of Bahram
Tabatabai for providing false identification to MEK; Tabatabai pied guilty before trial),
available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pr/218.htm. In the months since 9/11 , in contrast, there
have been at least ten prosecutions involving thirty defendants. One Justice Department of
ficial recently testified, moreover, that the Department is pursuing more than seventy ter
rorist-financing or material-support investigations and that it has brought "support" charges
against sixty-one individuals. See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi
gations, House Committee on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (prepared statement
of Alice Fisher, Deputy Assistant Attorney General), available at http:l/financialservices.
house.gov/media/pdf/031103af.pdf. The discrepancy between my figure of thirty and her fig
ure of sixty-one may reflect charges under other support-related laws such as § 2339A; the
existence of sealed indictments; or pending investigations. See, e.g. , Nicholas K. Geranios,
Ex-Gridder Held in Probe of Two Islamic Charities, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 19, 2003, at B4
(describing material support investigations of two Islamic charities).
·

123. See United States v. Zayed, (M-03-0043) (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (detailing similar allega
tions against Al-Moayad's assistant); Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant, United States
v. Al-Moayad, M-03-0016 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Indictment, United States v. Sattar, No.
02 Cr. 395 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y.) 'lI 'lI 21(cc)-(gg) (alleging that Ahmed Abdel Sattar and Yassir
Al-Sirri arranged the transfer of funds to the Islamic Group, a DFTO).
124. See Indictment, United States v. Shah, No. 02 Cr 2912L (S.D. Cal 2002); see also
Criminal Complaint, United States v. Varela, No. 1 1-02-1008M (S.D. Tex. 2002) (alleging
scheme to purchase a range of weapons and equipment on behalf of the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia); United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (de
scrib ing allegation that Sattar provided communications equipment, among other things).
125. See Indictment, United States v. Ujaama (W.D. Wash.) [hereinafter Ujaama In
dictment]; see also Indictment, United States v. Al-Arian, No. 8:03-CR-T (M.D. Fla.) (al
leging, among other things, provision of accounting services); Indictment, United States v.
Battle., No. Cr. 02-399 HA (D. Oregon) (alleging that Battel and five others were involved
in an attempt to enter Afghanistan in late 2001 in order to provide military services to Al
Qaeda); Criminal Complaint, United States v. Hawash, No. Cr. 03-M-481 (D. Or.) (same);
Indictment, United States v. Paracha, No. 03 Cr. 236 (S.D.N.Y.) (alleging provision of finan
cial and other services to Al Qaeda).
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personnel to a DFfO, as in the cases against John Walker Lindh and
Lynne Stewart.126
The personnel charges are of particular interest. In some respects,
the meaning of "personnel" is straightforward. According to the
United States Attorneys' Manual:
a person may be prosecuted under § 23398 for providing "personnel" to
a designated foreign terrorist organization if and only if that person has
knowingly provided the organization with one or more individuals to
work under the foreign entity's direction or control. . . . Only individuals
who have subordinated themselves to the [DFTO], i.e. , those acting as
full-time or part-time employees or otherwise taking orders from the en
tity, are under its direction or control.127

There is, however, a twist: the government interprets "personnel"
to include not only the act of recruiting others but, also, the act of
providing yourself as personnel. And in substance, the reflexive inter
pretation of personnel criminalizes the status of being a member of a
DFfO subject to its direction or control. This position is stated
expressly in the United States Attorneys' Manual, which explains that:
[t]here are two different ways of providing "personnel" to a designated
foreign terrorist organization:
trol of the organization; or

2)

1)

by working under the direction or con

by recruiting another to work under its di

rection or control. The statute encompasses both methods, so long as the
requisite direction or control is present.128

It is not clear to what extent the government has relied on the
reflexive interpretation of "personnel" in actual § 2339B prosecutions;
the indictments and criminal complaints in the § 2339B cases do not
specify the aspect of the material support definition in issue. It
appears, however, that the reflexive-personnel theory has surfaced in
at least three cases. One is the prosecution of Joh n Walker Lindh,

1 26. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 , 568 (E.D. Ya. 2002); Sattar, 272 F.
Supp. 2d at 357; see also Ujaama Indictment, supra note 125. For detailed discussions of the
Steward prosecution, see Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the
Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173 (2003) [here
inafter Margulies, The Virtues of Vices of Solidarity], and George Packer, Left Behind, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
127. U.S. DEP'T OF J USTICE, u. s. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, § 9-91.100 (June 2001)
[hereinafter U. S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL), available at http:www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_
reading__room/title9/9lmcrm.htm; see also Lindh, 21 2 F. Supp. 2d at 572 (construing "per
sonnel" to include the direction or control criterion). But see Humanitarian Law Project v.
Reno, 205 F.3d 1 130, 1 1 37-38 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding in the context of an interlocutory
appeal from a preliminary injunction that "personnel" is unconstitutionally vague because it
might be thought to encompass independent advocacy on behalf of a DFTO). The district
court in Humanitarian Law Project subsequently issued a permanent injunction on this
ground. See Henry Weinstein, Judge Strikes Down Parts of1996 Terrorism Law, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 200 1 , at A4. The issue currently is back before the Ninth Circuit, and the Justice
Department is considering legislation that would incorporate the "direction or control" cri
teria into the statutory definition, among other things. See infra note 179.
1 28. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' M ANUAL, supra note 127, at * 9-91.100.
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which resulted in a plea agreement.129 As the district j udge described
the charges, Lindh was "accused of joining groups that do not merely
advocate terror, violence, and the murder of innocents; these groups
actually carry out what they advocate and those who join them, at
whatever level, participate in the group's acts of terror, violence, and
murder. "130 Anot.her case that might involve the self-provision of
personnel is the ongoing prosecution of the men from Lackawanna
who attended al Farooq.131 Finally, the government has expressly
asserted this theory in connection with the prosecutions of Lynne
Stewart and Ahmed Abdel Sattar.132
Even without the reflexive interpretation of personnel, § 2339B
has tremendous utility for preventing terrorism due to its capacity to
cut off the flow of funds, equipment, and services to DFfOs. But
interpreting "personnel" reflexively gives § 2339B an additional; more
direct capacity for prevention. With this interpretation, the govern
ment has grounds to arrest a suspected member of a DFfO without
having to wait for evidence that the suspect is acting in furtherance of

129. For an interesting post-mortem on the Lindh prosecution, see Jane Mayer, Lost in
the Jihad, NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50.
130. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 569 (emphasis added).
131. See Gaba I, supra note 3, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 194 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that
one can provide material support to a DFfO "by offering one's services to said organiza
tion"). In light of the emphasis on training in the Lackawanna indictments and plea agree
ments, moreover, the government may in that case be using a reflexive interpretation not
only of "personnel" but, also, "training." See id. (holding that "one can be found to have
'provided material support' . . . by . . . allowing one's self to be indoctrinated and trained as a
'resource' in that organization's beliefs and activities"). Such an interpretation of "training"
is difficult to square with the statutory text and, notably, the U.S. Attorney's Manual does
not appear to authorize it. See U.S. ATIORN EYS MANUAL, supra note 127, at § 9-91.100 (in
structing that "a person may be prosecuted under § 2339B for providing 'training' to a desig
nated foreign terrorist organization if and only if that person has knowingly provided in
struction to the organization designed to impart one or more specific skills" (emphasis
added)). Further constitutional challenges to the application of § 2339B in the Lackawanna
case will not be forthcoming, however, in light of the fact that all of the apprehended defen
dants have entered guilty pleas. See Press Release, U .S. Dep't of Justice, Seventh Defendant
Named in Buffalo Cell Case, Charged with Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda, May
21, 2003 (describing plea agreements and indicating that the remaining Lackawanna suspect
remains at large, possibly outside the United States), available at 2003 WL 21197083. On a
disturbing note, the Wall Street Journal recently reported that at least some of these plea
agreements were reached after prosecutors allegedly "threatened the defendants with 'en
emy combatant' status." Paltrow, supra note 6; cf Mosed Plea Agreement, supra note 3, 'j[ 29
(waiving "any right" the government has "to detain the defendant as an enemy combatant");
Gaba Plea Agreement, supra note 3, 'l[ 29 (same). A more recent account, however, suggests
that government leverage flowed from the prospect of an additional weapons charge. See
Purdy & Bergman, supra note 3.
132. See Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Pretrial Mo
tions, United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2003) (arguing that
Stewart provided herself as' personnel to the Islamic Group when she purposefully assisted
Sheik Omar Ahmad Ali Rahman in circumventing Special Administrative Measures de
signed to keep Rahman from communicating with his followers).
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some specific illegal e rid; the person's membership status alone pro
vides sufficient grounds to act.
C.

The Constitutional Boundaries of § 2339B

In the remaining pages I assess Cole and Dempsey's criminalized
association critique of § 2339B in light of the particular characteristics
of each category of material support described above. I begin with
funding, and conclude with the reflexive interpretation of personnel.

1.

Funding

Financial support can of course implicate First Amendment
considerations, because such support can serve as a proxy for speech
or as a manifestation of association.133 For this reason, the aspect of §
2339B that prohibits financial support for DFTOs is subject to some
degree of First Amendment scrutiny. It does not follow, however, that
§ 2339B's funding ban triggers the specific intent requirement set forth
in Scales and other criminalized association cases from the Cold War
era.134 Those decisions addressed statutes that purposefully targeted
membership and advocacy. Section 2339B's ban on funding, in con
trast, burdens First Amendment activity only incidentally.
The distinction between purposeful and incidental restrictions on
expression - including expressive association - is crucial because the
First Amendment demands more from the government when it acts
purposefully to interfere with expression.135 Translated into doctrinal
terms, this means that an expression-neutral government action that

133. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960) (holding that a statute requiring
disclosure of organizations to which teachers made contributions implicated the "right of
free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free
speech, lies at the foundation of a free society"); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def.
and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799 (1985) (holding that a charitable contribution "functions
as a general expression of support for the recipient and its views"); Buckley v. Valeo, 404
U.S. 1 , 21 (1976) (electoral campaign contributions); cf Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217 (2000) (compelled contribution of student activity fees implicates First Amendment
interests); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (compelled contribution of bar association
dues); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ. , 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (compelled contribution of service
fee to a union). But see J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85
YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). Monetary exchanges of course do not always implicate the First
Amendment. See, e.g. , David Schultz, Revisiting Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line
Between Candidate Contri.butions and Independent Expenditures, 14 J.L. POLITICS 33, 78-79
(1998).
1 34. See supra notes 1 11 - 1 18 and accompanying text.
135. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 (2d ed. 1 988);
Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions
on Communications, 26 W M . & MARY L. REV. 779, 782-85 (1985) (observing that the same
distinction will not hold true for those who subscribe to what he terms the "positive concep
tion of the first amendment," which deemphasizes intent and motive and focuses instead on
impact).
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only incidentally impacts expression is not subject to strict scrutiny
with its exacting tailoring requirements. Instead, such action is subject
to intermediate scrutiny along the lines set forth in United States v.
O'Brien:136 the government action must be content-neutral and within
the government's constitutional authority; it must serve substantial or
important interests; and it must "not 'burden substantially more
speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate inter
ests.' "137
First Amendment challenges to economic embargoes of hostile
foreign states illustrate this point, as Gerald Neuman and Frederick
Schauer have observed.138 In Teague v. Regional Commissioner
of Customs, for example, the Second Circuit addressed a First
Amendment challenge to the "Foreign Asset Control Regulations"
promulgated pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, which at
the time prohibited transactions with China, North Korea, or North
Vietnam irrespective of one's intent.139 As the Court explained, the
regulations "were designed to limit the flow of currency to specified
hostile nations," reflecting the fact that " [h]ard currency is a weapon
in the struggle between the free and the communist worlds."140 The
Court acknowledged that the regulations "impinge[d] on first amend
ment freedoms" by, in this instance, limiting the availability of publi
cations and films from the designated countries.141 B ut the Court held
that this infringement was incidental to the regulations' purpose, and
therefore concluded that the appropriate level of scrutiny for the
regulations was that set forth in O'Brien.142 Under that rubric, the
Court upheld the regulations.143
Perhaps more pertinent is the decision in Farrakhan v. Reagan.144
The Reagan administration had imposed an embargo on Libya in 1986
in response to a variety of terrorist attacks carried out by Libyan

136. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
137. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 , 799 (1989)).
138. See Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation, and the First Amendment
After Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 330 (2000); Schauer, supra note 135.
139. 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)). The Trading With the
Enemy Act was supplanted by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-228, 91 Stat. 1 625 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701-1706 (2000)).
140. Teague, 404 F.2d at 445 (quoting Sardino v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 1 06, 112
(2d Cir. 1 966) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
14l. Id.
1 42. Id. at 446.
1 43. Id. ; see also Veterans and Reservists for Peace in Vietnam v. Reg'l Comm'r of Cus
toms, 459 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1972) (upholding regulations under Trading With the Enemy Act
against prior restraint challenge).
144. 669 F. Supp. 506 (D.C. Cir. 1 987).
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agents, and the effect was "to halt virtually all economic intercourse
with Libya." 145 Among other things, the embargo prevented the plain
tiff mosque from repaying a loan from an agency of the Libyan gov
ernment. The mosque argued that this prohibition, among other
things, violated their free exercise and free speech rights. The Court
assumed for the sake of argument that "contributions to Libyan or
ganizations are a form of symbolic speech," but because the embargo
impacted such speech only incidentally to its expression-neutral
purpose of suppressing Libyan sponsorship of terrorism, the Court
applied intermediate scrutiny pursuant to O'Brien and upheld the
embargo.146
Gerald Neuman has correctly argued that the analogy between the
embargo cases and § 2339B's funding prohibitions is strong.147 In both
instances, the government has in substance prohibited transactions
with a foreign entity in furtherance of America's national security and
foreign policy interests, irrespective of whether a person intends to
facilitate any harmful conduct by engaging in such transactions.148 The
two scenarios are technically distinct in the sense that embargoes
quarantine states, whereas § 2339B quarantines foreign sub-state
groups. But this is a distinction without a difference for purposes of
First Amendment law (and for many other purposes, in light of the
demonstrated capacity of some sub-state entities to inflict harm on a
scale previously thought possible only for states ) . 149
145. Farrakhan, 669 F. Supp. at 508.
146. Id. at 5 12; see also Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (applying
O 'Brien in course of upholding Cuban embargo provisions against First Amendment chal
lenge).
147. See Neuman, supra note 138, at 330 & n.79.
148. Cf People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C.
Cir. 1 999) (refusing to review substance of DFfO decision by the Secretary of State on justi
ciability grounds in view of the foreign policy considerations involved); Neuman, supra note
138, at 331 . Neuman observes that:
[f]oreign organizations differ from domestic organizations in the degree to which the federal
government has the capacity to control their actions directly. The United States has limited
ability to enforce antiterrorist legislation against foreign organizations that are based in
countries with which the United States has amicable relations, and even less ability to en
force it against organizations that are based in hostile countries. The federal government
therefore has fewer alternatives to burdening associational activities as a means of combat
ing terrorism.
Id.
1 49. See Neuman, supra note 138, at 331 n.79.
As Professor Cole points out, the fact that foreign organizations engaged in violence are not
themselves states provides a potential basis for distinguishing these precedents. Nonstate or
ganizations, however, can pose threats to the lives of U.S. citizens or to U.S. security inter
ests as great as those posed by many states, and their overseas location similarly limits the
ability of the U.S. government to counteract those threats. The analogy therefore appears
more persuasive than the distinction.
Id. ; see also David Cole, Damage Control? A Comment on Professor Neuman 's Reading of
Reno v. AADC, GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 347, 358 (2000).
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Like the embargoes discussed above, § 2339B 's ban on providing
funds to DFfOs implicates the O'Brien standard for assessing First
Amendment challenges to laws which burden expression inciden
tally.150 And again like the embargoes, § 2339B's funding ban comports
with that standard.
As a threshold matter, the funding ban is content-neutral.151 Its
purpose is not to suppress expression or association but instead to
reduce DFfOs' capacity for political violence, thereby preserving life
and property and preventing interference with foreign policy goals.152
As Teague put the point in the embargo context, "restricting the flow
of information or ideas is not the purpose of the regulations. The
restriction of First Amendment freedoms is only incidental to the
proper general purpose of the regulations: restricting the dollar flow to
hostile nations."153 The next consideration - whether the government

150. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1 130, 1 134-35 (9th Cir. 2000)
(citing O 'Brien, inter alia, in the course of rejecting freedom of association challenge to §
'23398); cf Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 58, 81 -82
(D.D.C. 2002) (applying O 'Brien, in context of free expression argument, to uphold order
freezing assets of charity for providing financial support to a terrorist group); Global Relief
Found. Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 806 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (same); Mendelsohn v.
Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474, 1482 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (applying O 'Brien analysis to a 1987 law
which barred "the receipt and expenditure of funds from the PLO," reasoning that the law's
impact on First Amendment interests is incidental); see also Margulies, The Virtues of Vices
of Solidarity, supra note 126, at 202. Notably, the Seventh Circuit has held that the proper
doctrinal framework for assessing a First Amendment challenge to § 23398's funding ban is
provided by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d
1000, 1 025-27 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding the funding ban in the context of a civil action un
der 1 8 U.S.C. § 2333 predicated on a § 23398 violation). But as the Ninth Circuit made clear
in Humanitarian Law Project, application of the O'Brien framework to § 2339B's funding
ban is entirely consistent with Buckley. See Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1134-35;
see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov. PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000) (explaining that "re
strictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on inde
pendent spending," that " [i]t has, in any event, been plain ever since Buckley that contribu
tion limits would more readily clear the hurdles before them," and that even a contribution
limit that caused significant interference with associational rights could survive if the Gov
ernment could show the regulation was "closely drawn" to achieve a "sufficiently important
interest" (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
1 51. See United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding
that "§ 2339B's prohibitions are content-neutral and its purpose of deterring and punishing
the provision of material support or resources to foreign terrorist organizations - a purpose
aimed not at speech but at conduct - is, of course, legitimate").
152. See Neuman, supra note 138, at 330:
(T] he statute prohibits the conduct of providing funds to designated organizations, and does
so for the purpose of re ducing the organizations' capacity to commit violent acts. It is em
bedded within a statutory scheme that includes other measures for depriving designated or
ganizations of U.S. based assets. Arguably then, the prohibition on providing funds should
be viewed as an incidental burden on First Amendment activity, rather than as a targeted

regulation of First Amendment activity.
153. Teague v. Reg'I Comm'r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441 , 445 (2d Cir. 1968); see also
Baim, 291 F.3d at 1027 (holding that the government's interest in suppressing terrorism pur
suant to § 23398 and related statutes is "unrelated to suppressing free expression"); cf
Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (observing that "the travel-payment
restrictions are aimed at denying hard currency to Cuba, rather than at suppressing the re-
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is empowered to enact the law in the first place - is not in serious dis
pute here. And there is no question that the government's interests in
this context are sufficiently irnportant. 154
The real issue is whether § 2339B is a sufficiently tailored means of
achieving the government's purpose. Put another way, the question is
whether § 2339B 's funding ban burdens substantially more expressive
activity than necessary in order to achieve the goal of suppressing
political violence. 155
This question goes to the heart of the authors' critique of § 2339B.
That critique begins from the premise that not all donations to a
DFTO are intended to be used, or in fact are used, to facilitate terror
ist acts; some DFTOs after all are hybrid groups engaged in both legal
and illegal activity.156 A financial contribution to the political/social
wing of Barnas, they argue, will not necessarily increase the capacities
of its military wing.157 Cole and Dempsey conclude that the Scales speceipt of information from or about Cuba, and Walsh does not dispute this point"); Farra
khan v. Reagan, 669 F. Supp. 506, 510 n. 7 (D.D.C. 1987) (in context of free exercise claim,
characterizing the nature of the government's interests as concerning national security and
international terrorism) .
154. See Boim, 291 F.3d at 1027 ("Applying the Buckley standard t o section 2333 claims
founded on conduct that would give rise to criminal liability under section 2339B, we con
clude that the government's interest in preventing terrorism is not only important but para
mount."); Holy Land Foundation, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 82 (holding that "combating terrorism
by undermining its financial base" is an "important and substantial government interest");
Global Relief Foundation, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (holding that the asset freeze order "pro
motes an important and substantial government interest - that of preventing terrorist at
tacks"); Mendelsohn v. Meese, 686 F. Supp. 75, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that it "is beyond
argument that the interest of the United States is a compelling one" and that " [t]his interest
is unrelated to the prevention of free expression").
155. As noted above, the means chosen need not be the absolutely least restrictive al
ternative available. See, e.g. , Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994);
Walsh, 927 F.2d at 1235. Frederick Schauer has observed that the tailoring requirement of
O 'Brien "seems sometimes not to be applied at all, and sometimes to be applied in different
ways," and concludes from a review of the decisions that the standard has relatively little
bite except when an additional First Amendment factor - such as a public forum - is
involved. Schauer, supra note 135, at 786, 788-89.
1 56. The authors emphasize the example of Hamas. TERRORISM, p. 120. Hamas devotes
much of its resources to political and social activities, but of course also has a terrorist
"wing" or "arm" - the Izz Al-Din Al-Qassem Brigades - which carries out suicide bomb
ings and other forms of political violence. See YONAH ALEXANDER, PALESTINIAN
RELIGIOUS TERRORISM: HAMAS AND ISLAMIC JIHAD 1 1-12 (2002). The United States has
designated Hamas as a whole to be a terrorist organization. See, e.g. , U.S. Dep't of State,
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Aug. 9, 2002, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/
topical/pol/terror/designated.htm.
157. Scholars dispute the meaningfulness of alleged distinctions between terrorist
groups' social and military "wings." See, e.g. , Matthew Levitt, Stemming the Flow of Terrorist
Financing: Practical and Conceptual Challenges, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Win
ter/Spring 2003, at 59, 64-66 ("[d]ebunking the Myth of the 'Wings' "); Peter Margulies, Un
certain A rrivals: Immigration, Terror, and Democracy After September l l , 2002 UTAH L.
REV. 481, 506-07 (2002) (stating that "an organization cannot hermetically seal off acts of
violence against civilians from other aspects of its operations," and noting that humanitarian
activities by such groups "serve marketing goals" by "lend[ing] organizations that conduct
terrorist activities a veneer of respectability and religious authority"); cf H EYMANN, supra
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cific intent requirement therefore is needed to avoid suppressing such
"innocent" expressive activity ( Terrorism, p. 123; Enemy Aliens, pp.
59-64).
It is anything but clear, however, that the government's compelling
interest in reducing political violence by cutting off funding to certain
foreign organizations could still be achieved if subjected to such a spe
cific intent requirement.158 The problem is that notwithstanding good
intentions, donors of financial support cannot actually control how a
DFfO will spend the money. Even if the donor has the most noble of
intentions, the money may nonetheless be diverted to violent ends. It
is perhaps for this reason that when Congress enacted § 2339B, it
expressly found that "foreign organizations that engage in terrorist
activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution
to such an organization facilitates that conduct."159
In this context, imposition of a specific intent requirement would
not serve to keep the government from overreaching so much as it
would prevent the government from achieving its compelling interest
in cutting off financial support that - intentionally or not - facilitates
terrorism. Section 2339B 's funding ban therefore does not burden sub
stantially more expression than necessary to achieve its goals, despite
its lack of a specific-intent requirement.

2.

Equipment and Services

Section 2339B bans more than financial contributions, of course.
As discussed above, it also prohibits the provision of a range of tangi
ble items and services I have grouped under the headings of "equip
ment" and "services." Does the ban on providing these forms of sup
port, irrespective of the donor's intent, implicate First Amendment
considerations different in kind than those discussed above in the con
text of financial support? It is difficult to see how this might be. Even
assuming that the provision of equipment or services to a DFfO
involves elements of expression or association, the impact of § 2339B
on such First Amendment interests again would be incidental, and

note 54, at 97 (acknowledging hybrid nature of some groups, but observing that "it is not too
much to ask of an organization seeking support for its nonviolent activities that it abandon
violence as a condition of receiving that support," nor that would-be supporters "find an or
ganization prepared to further these activities without also using violence").
158. See Holy Land Foundation, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 81 (holding that "imposing a 'spe
cific intent' requirement on the Government's authority to issue blocking orders would sub
stantially undermine the purpose of the economic sanctions programs," and observing that
regardless of its intent Holy Land could not control how Hamas uses its donations). For
much the same reason, the First Amendment would not require a showing of specific intent
in connection with an embargo of a foreign state.
159. Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
301(a)(7), 1 1 0 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
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again O 'Brien-style intermediate scrutiny would provide the relevant
analytical framework.
Section 2339B is analogous in this context to laws such as the
Export Administration Act160 and the Arms Export Control Act,161
which prohibit the export of certain technologies and equipment to
designated countries. 162 If the government can bar the shipment of
night vision goggles or the provision of instruction in advanced nuclear
physics computer technology to North Korea, it would seem it could
equally prevent the same with respect to a hostile foreign group such
as Hezbollah. In light of the harm that might ensue from such ship
ments, it matters not at all how the donor or provider intends for the
equipment or services to be used.163 What does matter is that the ban is
not enacted in order to interfere with First Amendment activity, but
instead to achieve unrelated goals of foreign and national security
policy.164

3.

The Reflexive Interpretation ofPersonnel

In the preceding pages I have argued that the guilt by association
critique of § 2339B mistakenly collapses the distinction between gov160. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (2000). The export-control regime of the Export
Administration Act has been extended by Executive Order pursuant to the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000). See Exec. Order No.
13,222, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,025 (Aug. 17, 2001) as extended by the Notice of August 14, 2002, 67
Fed. Reg. 53,721 (Aug. 14, 2002).
161. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2000).
162. Section 2339B in this respect also parallels 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(l) (2000), which ren
ders it illegal for a licensed firearm dealer, importer, manufacturer, or collector to provide a
firearm to a minor. It is no defense to a violation of this law that the provider did not intend
for the minor to use the firearm to commit a crime or otherwise use it in a harmful manner,
and no such defense would be available even if a provider had an expressive interest of some
sort in this particular conduct.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Shetterly, 971 F.2d 67, 73 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the
Export Administration Act requires only an intent to export proscribed items in violation of
the statute); United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1 387, 1 391 ( 1 1th Cir. 1983) (same).
164. The equipment category does have a flaw, albeit not one related to the
criminalized-association argument. The problem is one of drafting, and it follows from the
decision to incorporate § 2339A's definition of "material support" into § 2339B. In the
context of § 2339A the drafters had every incentive to cast the "material support" net as
widely as possible in hopes of encompassing unanticipated forms, because that statute re
quires proof of the supporter's intent to facilitate a criminal act. Thus the definition includes
not just weapons and cash but, also, "other physical assets." Section 2339B incorporates this
sweeping term but, as we know, does not cabin it with a corresponding intent requirement.
As a result, critics of the law are able to point to absurd but technically possible hypothetical
scenarios such as the deportation of an immigrant for sending a "toy train set to a day-care
center run by" a DFTO. See Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 1 5, at 967. While it is quite pos
sible if not likely that a reviewing court would interpret the term "other physical assets" to
reach only items which reasonably could be diverted or converted to harmful uses, this ap
proach might in turn raise a question of vagueness. Accordingly, Congress would be well
advised to provide § 2339B with its own definition of "material support," replacing "other
physical assets" with more specific descriptions.
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ernment action which purposefully infringes First Amendment rights
and action which does so only incidentally. On its face, § 2339B is the
latter type of statute. But there is one limited respect in which § 2339B
does appear to interfere purposefully with First Amendment activity.
The definition of prohibited material support includes the provision of
personnel, and as noted above the government has taken the position
in litigation and in its own internal guidelines that this includes
providing one's self as personnel.
The reflexive interpretation of personnel in substance criminalizes
at least some forms of membership in a DFTO. This aspect of § 2339B
thus is different in kind from the statute's other prohibitions, none of
which purposefully limit expression or association. The ban on pro
viding one's self as personnel thus seems at first blush to fall squarely
within the rule of Scales and other anticommunist cases dealing with
statutes that similarly prohibited association with dangerous groups.
The government, not insensitive to this possibility, takes the posi
tion that "personnel" should be understood to reach only the subset of
association in which one is not merely a nominal member of a group
but a quasi-employee subject to the DFTO's direction or control.165
Understood this way, § 2339B punishes the conduct of providing a
human resource to the DFTO, while leaving ample opportunity for
those who wish to do so to express symboiically their support for the
group through nominal affiliation or independent advocacy.
This argument has been met with approval by two of the three
courts to have confronted it since 9/11 . 1 66 In the prosecution of John
Walker Lindh, for example, the district j udge held that "the plain
meaning of 'personnel' is such that it requires . . . an employment or
employment-like relationship between the persons in question and the
[DFT0] ."167 This interpretation, the j udge explained, did not foreclose
membership in a DFTO: "One can become a member of a political
party without also becoming a part of its 'personnel.' "168 Relying on
the Lindh decision, moreover, the magistrate j udge in the Lackawanna
case went a step further, holding that "one can be found to have 'pro
vided material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization'
by offering one's self to be indoctrinated and trained as a 'resource' in
that organization's beliefs and activities. "169 In contrast, the district
court in the Lynne Stewart prosecution refused to consider the gov165. See U.S. ATIORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 127, § 9-91. 100; United States v . Sattar,
272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 358-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v.
Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), at 55-56 (June 13, 2003) [hereinafter Stewart Transcript),
available at http://www.lynnestewart.org/ReportJune13Hearing.pdf.
166. But see Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F. 3d 1 130, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2000).
167. See United States v. Lindh, F. Supp. 3d 541 , 574 (E.D. Va. 2002).
1 68. Id. at 572.
169. Gaba I, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 194.
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ernment's "direction or control" interpretation on the ground that it
was not part of the statute, and accordingly held that the term "per
sonnel" is unconstitutionally vague.170
But even assuming it is correct that the direction or control limita
tion preserves space for nominal membership in a DFTO, the question
remains whether the First Amendment tolerates direct suppression of
more substantial forms of association absent proof of knowledge or
intent. The beginnings of an answer are in Scales. One of the threshold
issues in that case was whether the statute's membership provision
punished mere nominal membership in communist organizations. 171
The Court resolved this question by construing the statute to exclude
nominal membership and to reach only "active" members of the
organization with knowledge of the group's illegal purposes. 172 But
even after thus limiting the statute's scope to the subset of active
members, the Court still held that the statute must be construed to
contain an intent requirement insofar far as it criminalized associa
tion.173
When a statute premises criminal punishment on membership
status alone, then, it does not matter for First Amendment purposes
whether that punishment is limited to a subset of the persons associ
ated with that group. Whatever subset is selected, heightened First
Amendment concerns arise when the punishment targets association
rather than, say, conduct along the lines of providing financial support,
equipment, or services to the group. As the Court in Scales wrote,
there is "a real danger that legitimate political expression or associa
tion would be impaired" if the government were permitted to punish
acts of pure association without proof of a specific intent to further an
organization's illegal goals.174
None of this is to say, of course, that the government cannot
punish membership in a DFTO under any circumstances.175 And natu-

170. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 359. In so holding, the court followed the pre-9/11 decision by the Ninth Circuit in Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F. 3d at 1 137-38.
171. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 209 (1961).
172. See id.
173. See id. at 222-30; supra notes 1 12-1 18 and accompanying text.
174. See Scales, 367 U.S. at 229.
1 75 . This is particularly true of DFTOs such as Al Qaeda which have little or no legiti
mate functions. ENEMY ALIENS, p. 63. In such instances, Cole argues, it should prove rela
tively easy to establish that one who became a member of the DFTO did so with knowledge
of its illicit activities and an intent to further them. ENEMY ALIENS, p. 63. Cole repeats this
point in The New McCarthyism, supra note 15, at 14:
An organization like Al Qaeda may present a special case, for it does not appear to have le
gal purposes at all. Unlike, say. the Irish Republican Army, the Palestinian Liberation Or
ganization, or the ANC, groups with political agendas that use violent means among many
others, Al Qaeda appears to do little more than plot, train for, and conduct terrorism. But if
that is the case, we do not need guilt by association. I t ought to be relatively simple to estab-

May 2003]

Civil Liberties and Terrorism Prevention

145 1

rally a DFfO member who provides services, equipment, o r funding
to the group will be independently subject to prosecution under §
2339B without respect . to . . that person's membership status. But
assuming that as a society we continue to hold . with the First Amend
ment values expressed in Scales, prosecutions based solely on a per
son's status as a member of a DFfO must comport with Scales's intent
requirement.176
Do we as a society continue to hold such values? The pathological
perspective suggests that we are fair-weather friends to civil liberties,
that we readily abandon them in times of perceived crisis. To the
extent we currently are in the midst of such a period, then as Mark
Tushnet has predicted, "we can expect courts to uphold [§ 2339B]
convictions in the face of claims that the government failed to show
that the defendant shared the illegal goals. And, we can expect that
several years later, courts will begin to require such a demonstration
from the government. "177
If this prediction comes to pass, then the short duration of §
2339B's flirtation with constitutional boundaries could be interpreted
as a testament to the continuing vitality of civil liberty protections
entrenched in the Cold War era. That outcome would endorse the
social-learning model, particularly if in the process courts further
refine our understanding of the permissible limits of criminalized asso
ciation. If, on the other hand, the reflexive interpretation of personnel
survives in its present form178 - or expands179 - then some civil liberlish that when an individual affirmatively supports Al Qaeda, he intends to support its ter
rorist ends, because Al Qaeda has few if any other ends.
176. The government conceded this point, albeit temporarily, in recent litigation. Dur
ing oral argument on the defendants' motion to dismiss the material support charges in the
Lynne Stewart case, the judge questioned prosecutors about the extent to which the "per
sonnel" provision would preclude a DFTO from being able to retain an attorney. Counsel
for the government responded that,
[i]t may be, your Honor, that in such instances. the Court needs to apply a heightened level
of scienter for certain aspects of the statute like perhaps personnel, in other words, to show
an intent on the behalf of the attorney to further the illegal objectives of the terrorist organi
zation.
See Stewart Transcript, supra note 165, at 59-60. Subsequently, however, the government
submitted a letter to the court withdrawing this concession. See Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 360
(citing letter of the United States dated June 27, 2003, at 3 n.3).
177. Tushnet, sup;a note 41, at 293.
178. Testifying before the House Judiciary Committee in June 2003, Attorney General
Ashcroft urged Congress to make clear that "going and joining the operation is providing
material support." The Justice Department and the USA PATRIOT Act: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2003) (oral testimony of Attorney General
John Ashcroft), available at 2003 WL 21291138. It is unclear whether Attorney General
Ashcroft meant by these words to advocate criminal liability for membership absent intent,
however, given that he also stated that "we need for the law to make it clear that it's just as
much a conspiracy to aid and assist the terrorist to go and fight - to join them for fighting
purposes, as it is to carry them a lunch or to provide them a weapon. " Id. (oral testimony of
Attorney General John Ashcroft) (emphasis added).
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ties gains of the past will have been lost in much the same m�nner as
Cole predicts in Enemy Aliens. By the same token, the resulting
expansion of criminalized association principles would exacerbate the
concerns expressed by Cole and Dempsey in Terrorism and the
Constitution regarding the chilling effect of government investigations
on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms; insofar as membership
in a DFTO itself is illegal, the extent to which investigations will focus
on advocacy as an indicia of membership will grow. It would, on the
whole, be an unfortunate fulfillment of the pessimistic predictions of
the adaptive-learning model.180
* * *

In many respects, the story of § 2339B and the guilt by association
critique symbolizes the tensions raised by the post-9/11 adoption of a
terrorism prevention paradigm. The material support law is in most
respects a sensible tool for achieving prevention, but as discussed
above it also has opened a window for a more direct form of preven
tion, and this raises significant civil liberties concerns. That window is
small for now, but it ·could open wider. Whether that happens, or if
instead the courts close it, will speak volumes about the staying power
of existing civil liberties protections during times of crisis, and there
fore about the relative merits of the social-learning and adaptive
learning models.

1 79. The Justice Department may be contemplating an expansion of the range of asso
ciation captured by the reflexive interpretation of "personnel." In February 2003, a draft
Justice Department proposal for new antiterrorism Jaws titled the "Domestic Security
Enhancement Act of 2003" ("DSEA'') was leaked to the public. Immediately tagged
"PATRIOT I I," the draft drew a significant amount of comments and criticisms. But few if
any paid attention to § 402 of the DSEA, which if adopted would amend § 2339B to provide
that
no person may be prosecuted under this section in connection with the term "personnel"
unless that person has knowingly provided, attempted to provide, or conspired to provide a
terrorist organization with one or more individuals ( which may be or include himself) to
work

in concert with the organization or under its direction or control.

Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, § 402 (Draft) (Jan. 9, 2003) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-hi.pdf. Adding the phrase "work in
concert with" as an alternative predicate to "under its direction or control" would of course
capture a larger slice of association than the latter alone.
180. Then again, either result would be equally consistent with the view expressed by
Posner and Vermeule to the effect that "there just are no systematic trends in the history of
civil liberties, no important ratchet-like mechanisms that cause repeated wars or emergen
cies to push civil liberties in one direction or another in any sustained fashion." Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 1 7 (manuscript at 16).

